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"In essence the impracticability doctrine says that contracts will be
enforced... unless it really hurts."'
INTRODUCTION
Between 1999 and 2002, the Euro,2 the European Union's future
single currency, will replace qualified 3 European Member States' cur-
rencies.4 Both commentators and practitioners see the continuity of
contracts as a key legal problem that Europe5 and the countries with
which it trades will soon face.6 For American companies and their
European trading partners, the issue of continuity of transatlantic
commercial contracts is likely to arise because they will be parties to
contracts denominated in currencies that no longer exist.7
1. Paul J. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market and the
Westinghouse Case, 6 J. Legal Stud. 119, 160 (1977).
2. The Euro will become the European Union's single currency as qualified Eu-
ropean Union Member States form a monetary union. Geoffrey Yeowart, Commis-
sion Publishes Blueprint for Euro Legal Framework, 16 Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 37 (1997).
3. To qualify, European Member States must meet economic criteria that demon-
strate economic health and convergence (low inflation, low government budget defi-
cits, low interest rates, and exchange rate stability). See infra note 57 and
accompanying text.
4. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC Treaty]; see also Calendar: What Will
Happen and When (visited Jan. 26, 1998) <http://europa.eu.int/euro/en/calendar.asp>
[hereinafter Calendar] (outlining the most probable timeline for the introduction of
the single currency); The 1998 Countdown to EMU (visited Jan. 26, 1998) <http://
amue.lf.net/news/newslet.28/n128_1.htm> (same). There is a slight possibility that no
Member State will qualify and the Economic and Monetary Union process will not go
forward. A convincing discussion of the probability of the implementation of the
Euro is beyond the scope of this Note. Therefore, this discussion will assume that the
Euro will be introduced in at least some Member States. For an article arguing for an
eventual large membership base, see Wolfgang Mtinchau, The First Wave: Probables
and Possibles, Fin. Times, May 28, 1998, (EMU: An FT Guide) at 3.
5. "With a gross domestic product of over $8 trillion, Europe is set to become the
largest trading group in the world .... EMU countries will comprise the world's
largest trading bloc, doing 21 percent of the world's trading, compared with 18 per-
cent for the United States." Becky Yerak, Counting Down to the Euro It May Be a
New European Currency, But Its Havoc Will Reach into Cleveland, The Plain Dealer,
Oct. 26, 1997, at 1-H, 5-H (quoting Sawar Kashmeri, President of Niche Systems, a
consulting firm that offers seminars to prepare U.S. businesses for the introduction of
the Euro).
6. See Dorothy Livingston & Bill Hutchings, Legal Issues Arising from the Intro-
duction of the Euro, 12 J. Int'l Banking L. 63, 63 (1997); Gordon Platt, Euro Launch
Could Keep Lawyers in Money for Years, J. Com., June 23, 1997, at 1A, 5A ("One
concern voiced on both sides of the Atlantic is continuity of contract. Most jurisdic-
tions, such as the United States and Britain, have doctrines such as 'impossibility' and
'frustration of purpose,' which may be used to discharge performance under binding
contracts due to unexpected or extraordinary events."); infra Part II.A (giving exam-
ples of affected transatlantic commercial contracts).
7. See Wendy Fowler, Practical Arrangements for the Introduction of the Single
Currency-the English Legal Issues, 10 Butterworths J. Int'l Banking & Fin. L. 534,
537 (1995) (outlining the legal issues that arise when a contract expressing its payment
obligation in a European currency is governed by the law of a state outside the Euro-
pean Union); Michael Gruson, The Introduction of the Euro and Its Implications for
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The question facing these contracting parties is a simple one: Will
U.S. courts enforce contracts in which the parties denominated the
payment obligation in an obsolete European currency?8 This Note
argues that U.S. courts should enforce these transatlantic commercial
contracts after the introduction of the Euro.
Part I presents the various stages that constitute the process of
achieving the European Monetary Union. This section also discusses
the timeline and requirements for introducing the Euro. In addition,
it surveys the expected benefits and likely consequences of a success-
ful implementation of the Euro.
Part II gives examples of potentially affected transatlantic commer-
cial contracts. This part then introduces the two domestic state stat-
utes and the applicable European legislation that provide for
continuity of contracts. Finally, this part discusses the grounds for ar-
guing against continuity of contract based on current impracticability
doctrines under the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), the Con-
vention on the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"), and the Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law's Principles of
International Commercial Contracts ("UNIDROIT Principles").
Part I argues in favor of continuity for the contracts at issue. First,
it discusses the importance of stability for contracts in the interna-
tional marketplace. It then argues that impracticability doctrines
should not apply to disrupt contractual relations when a government
decides to replace its currency. The value or cost of performance is
not likely to change radically. In a case where the value does shift, the
parties are likely to have allocated the risk, could have foreseen the
introduction of the Euro and its reasonable consequences, or implic-
itly agreed to renegotiate the contract. Furthermore, in the case of an
extreme change in the value or cost of performance due to the Euro,
the courts should first compel renegotiation or reform the contract
rather than discharge its obligations.
Obligations Denominated in Currencies Replaced by the Euro, 21 Fordham Int'l LJ.
65, 66 (1998) ("Some authors have expressed concern that long-term payment obliga-
tions,... denominated in the national currency of a Member State of the European
Union ('EU') participating in the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union
('EMU'), will no longer be enforceable in U.S. courts after the introduction of the
Euro.").
8. Yeowart, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing what might happen if a contract is
governed by the law of a state outside the EU). The analysis in this Note primarily
covers commercial contracts for the sale of goods. It will not discuss financial services
contracts or commercial paper.
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I. THE MECHANISMS AND POLICIES BEHIND THE
SINGLE CURRENCY
The Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU")9 was designed to
progress in three stages. In the third stage, the EMU will phase in the
Euro as the single European currency. After outlining the three
stages, this part will describe the expected benefits and costs of the
EMU and the introduction of the single European currency.
A. Achieving the European Monetary Union
The concept of a monetary union is a product of the larger effort to
economically integrate the economies of the European states.10 The
original Member States" came together after World War II and
agreed by treaty12 to form a community to prevent further savage con-
fficts. 3 Through some expansions in membership 14 and several treaty
amendments,' 5 the European Union emerged in 1993, when the Mem-
ber States ratified the Maastricht Treaty. 6 "[T]he European Union as
an organization... started out hoping to prevent war, and became an
9. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. The monetary union centralizes
the monetary policy of the participating Member States to maximize the benefit of a
unified market. See infra notes 66, 83 and accompanying text.
10. For more background on the evolution of monetary policy cooperation in Eu-
rope, see Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, The Road to Monetary Union in Europe (1994)
and David Currie & John Whitley, European Monetary Integration and Prospects for
Monetary Union, in Trade Blocs? The Future of Regional Integration 160 (Vincent
Cable & David Henderson eds., 1994) [hereinafter Trade Blocs].
11. France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg were the six
original Member States in the early 1950s. See George A. Bermann et al., Cases and
Materials on European Community Law 5 (1993).
12. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140, as amended, Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC
Official Pub. Off. 1987); Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended, Treaties Establishing the European Com-
munities (EC Official Pub. Off. 1987); Treaty Establishing the European Atomic En-
ergy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, as amended, Treaties Establishing
the European Communities (EC Official Pub. Off. 1987).
13. Bermann, supra note 11, at 3-11 (discussing the postwar movement towards
community and describing the first three treaties); Richard I. Fine & Francois Alland,
Current Political and Economic Developments in the European Union, 18 Whittier L.
Rev. 281, 282 (1997) ("Europe, having been laid waste by World War II, tried to
prevent the savagery of the European Conflicts in the future. Thus, three types of
organizations came forth: the European Coal and Steel Community... ; the Euro-
pean Economic Community ... ; and finally the Euratom."). These three organiza-
tions merged into the European Union. Id.
14. Currently, the European Union has fifteen members. They are: Belgium, Ger-
many, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United King-
dom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Member States of the
European Union (visited Feb. 17, 1998) <http://ananse.irv.uit.no/trade_law/status/eu/
eustatus.html> (giving the most current status of membership).
15. An example of an EC Treaty amendment is the Maastricht Treaty. freaty of
the European Union and Final Act, 1992 O.J. (C 224), 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
Maastricht Treaty].
16. Id.
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integrated union... somewhere along the line." 17 A monetary union
with a single currency wil be the ultimate manifestation of the Euro-
pean Member States' economic integration. 8
The concept of the EMU approaches the model of the American
economy. 19 Although the United States has fifty states, it has a single
currency2" and can boast considerable mobility of both people and
capital across state lines.2 The main motivation of the EMU is the
"general awareness over the decades of the perceived necessity of
bringing European nations and economies far more closely to-
gether."'  Success in achieving such a monetary union would stimu-
late economic growth and employment as a result of a reduction in
business costs and, therefore, lead to a rise in the standard of living for
the citizens of the European Union.'
The first plan for a monetary union in Europe, the Werner plan, 4
was conceived as early as 1970.2 The Werner plan proposed the
achievement of a monetary union with a single currency by 1980.26
This plan failed when the collapse of the Bretton Woods system,' the
17. Fine & Alland, supra note 13, at 282.
18. David Currie, The Pros and Cons of EMU 17-21 (1997); Padoa-Schioppa,
supra note 10, at 65.
19. See The State of the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before the Senate Budget Comm.,
105th Cong. (Jan. 29, 1998), available in 1998 WL 32040, at "41 (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve) [hereinafter Greenspan Testimony] (as-
serting that the EMU is modeled after the American economy). Mobility of people
and capital refers to the ease with which people and their assets cross state borders
within the United States.
20. Peter Gwin, A Brief History of the Dollar, Eur. Mag., Sept. 1997, (Special Re-
port) at 16.
21. Greenspan Testimony, supra note 19, at *41.
22. Id
23. See id.; Fine & Alland, supra note 13, at 284 ("The EMU is the logical comple-
ment to the single market... as it brings greater visibility and predictability to mar-
kets and investment.").
24. The Werner plan, also known as the Werner Report, envisioned a monetary
union for Europe with a single currency and its own institutions. Kenneth Dyson,
Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe 80-81
(1994) (citing Council-Commission of the European Communities, Report to the
Council and the Commission on the Realization by Stages of Economic and Monetary
Union in the Community - "Werner Report," Supplement to Bulletin 11-1970
(1970)).
25. Currie, supra note 18, at 19.
26. Id at 19.
27. Dyson, supra note 24, at 40-46 (describing the rise and fall of the Bretton
Woods system). The Bretton Woods system was an international fixed exchange-rate
system which relied on the U.S. dollar as its anchor currency. Id. at 40-41.
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oil crisis,28 and rapid inflation2 9 made unification of currencies
impossible."0
In 1979, the European Economic Community launched the Euro-
pean Monetary System ("EMS") to create intra-European exchange
rate stability.3 After a decade of EMS operation, the system proved
successful in stabilizing exchange rates.32 In 1987, the framers of the
Single European Act decided to include the goal of a monetary union,
now known as the EMU,33 in the European Community Treaty.34
They added a chapter entitled "Cooperation in Economic and Mone-
tary Policy" to the Treaty." The Delors Report of 1989 proposed con-
crete plans for another attempt at forming a monetary union. 6 In
1992, the Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on European
Union, built upon the Delors plan's outline of three stages toward the
achievement of EMU.
37
28. The international oil crisis was the result of an oil embargo, and its impact is
discussed in more detail below. See infra Part III.C.2.
29. Dyson, supra note 24, at 89.
[Tihe Werner report ... [assumed] that global coordination of a fixed ex-
change rate system would continue to operate and to do so effectively. This
assumption was soon revealed to be mistaken. Another assumption was that
economic development would enable continuing progress towards conver-
gence of economic performance, thus facilitating improved economic policy
coordination and monetary integration. Again, the external shocks adminis-
tered by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and then the first oil crisis
were to show the inadequacy of this assumption.
Id.
30. Currie, supra note 18, at 19-20; Dyson, supra note 24, at 82-83 (discussing de-
clining political commitment to the Werner plan and exchange rate problems in 1972
and 1973).
31. Currie, supra note 18, at 19-20; see infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
Exchange-rate stability means that the relative values of the Member States' curren-
cies vary only minimally from day to day. For a detailed discussion of the lessons
about institutional problems of the EMS, see Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 10, at 68-85.
32. Currie, supra note 18, at 20.
33. See Bermann, supra note 11, at 16-17, 1193-1204; Lionel Barber, Setting the
Stage for the Single Currency, Eur. Mag., Sept. 1997, (Special Report) at 3.
34. EC Treaty, supra note 4. The EC Treaty is the treaty that sets forth the new
legal order and the framework of the European Community. It binds all of the Mem-
ber States to the treaty and the institutions created by the treaty. One author de-
scribed the result of the EC Treaty as "a union of fifteen members active in economic,
political, social, and cultural spheres." Jonathan A.C. Wise, Note, Variable Geometry
and the European Central Bank: How the ECB Can Assert Itself Against Attacks
From Member States With Derogations, 20 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 407,407 (1997).
35. EC Treaty, supra note 4, tit. VI, chs. 1-4.
36. Jacques Delors was then President of the European Commission. The report
was published in April of 1989. Padoa-Schioppa, supra note 10, at 246. Padoa-Shi-
oppa offers a detailed discussion of this report and a comparison with the previous
Werner report. Id., at 137-49.
37. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 15; see also Joshua M. Wepman, Note, Article
104(c) of the Maastricht Treaty and European Monetary Union: Does Ireland Hold the
Key to Success?, 19 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 247, 249-52 (1996) (examining the
three steps towards convergence outlined in the Maastricht Treaty); Wise, supra note
34, at 409-411 (same).
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1. Stage One: Preparing for Financial Integration
From 1989 to 1993, Stage One38 of the process toward the EMU
focused on eliminating the obstacles to economic integration and co-
operation.39 The Member States dismantled restrictions on capital
movements across borders, which consisted mostly of currency con-
trols,' thereby coming closer to attaining free movement of capital.4
Additionally, all Member States adhered to the EMS42 and increased
the level of monetary policy coordination.43 The main feature of the
EMS is an exchange rate mechanism that establishes a fixed band
within which each Member State's currency may fluctuate 2.25%
higher or lower than a central rate." The exchange rate mechanism
aims to maintain exchange rate stability for the European Member
38. Christos Hadjiemmanuil, European Monetary Union, The European System of
Central Banks, and Banking Supervision: A Neglected Aspect of the Maastridht Treaty,
5 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 105, 107 (1997) (explaining that "[tihe first stage of the
process of monetary unification began prior to the Maastricht Treaty, on July 1, 19S9,
and comprised increased coordination of the monetary and economic policies of
Member States").
39. Currie, supra note 18, at 26-27.
40. See Council Directive 88/361 to Implement Article 67, 1988 0.I. (L 178) 5
(directing the Member States to abolish all restrictions on capital movement by July 1,
1990, with some exceptions); Berman, supra note 11, at 615-23, 1201. The removal
of controls on capital movement allows "access to efficient financial services within
the context of an integrated financial market;... [is] a part of the effort to achieve
monetary stability .... [and] promote[s] the optimum allocation of European sav-
ings." Id. at 615 (internal quotation and citations omitted).
41. Benn Steil, Competition, Integration and Regulation in EC Capital Markets, in
Trade Blocs, supra note 10, at 127 (examining the European capital markets and their
regulatory structure). "[A] tremendous increase in inter-market competition has ac-
companied major national deregulatory initiatives [and] the removal of capital con-
trols .... " Id. at 127. Furthermore, Mr. Steil asserts that "major political initiatives
such as the establishment of a single European currency would undoubtedly provide
an enormous spur to European capital market integration .... Id. at 128.
Freedom of capital is among the four freedoms preeminent in the EC Treaty. The
others are free movement of goods, persons, and services. Bermann, supra note 11, at
315.
Free movement of capital is a vital accessory to the other three basic free-
doms. Free movement of goods is impeded if payment for the goods is re-
stricted. Free movement of workers is limited if workers cannot bring funds
from the home State or if their income and savings cannot be freely trans-
ferred back to the home State. The right of establishment for commercial
and financial enterprises and the right to provide cross-border services are
substantially frustrated by significant restrictions on capital movements. An
integrated financial market is impossible without free movement of capital.
Id. at 606.
42. The EMS was created in 1979. David P. Valenti. Note, Currency Unification on
the European Economic Conwznuities: The Mechanics, Politics, and Probability for
Success, 28 Int'l Law. 1039 (1994). "The EEC did not design the EMS to be an end in
itself, but adopted the EMS as a step on the road toward accomplishment of complete
monetary union." Id. at 1046 (footnote omitted).
43. See id. at 1046.
44. See Currie, supra note 18, at 21.
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States. 5 The EMS also provides a forum for economic policy cooper-
ation through meetings of a committee comprised of European central
bank governors.46
Thus, Stage One set the tone for the rest of the integration process.
Already, the Member States had eliminated structural obstacles to the
free movement of capital to ensure a prosperous single market.
Moreover, they had started to coordinate their economic policies and
currencies through the EMS.
Between 1992 and 1993, currency speculation pressures and eco-
nomic circumstances forced the United Kingdom and Italy to with-
draw from the EMS.47 The EMS did recover, but had to expand the
permissible fluctuation band from 2.25% to 15% in 1993, which no
longer ensured the previously achieved level of stability.48 Although
the EMS crisis of the early 1990s was a setback, it did not doom the
EMU.4 9 The structure of the EMU would not allow foreign exchange
speculation to upset the monetary union as it had in the EMS.50
Therefore, the movement toward a monetary union continued.
2. Stage Two: The Path to Economic Convergence
Stage Two focuses on monetary convergence, the process by which
"the [fifteen] Member States of the European Union are supposed to
move progressively toward the economic virtue required for member-
ship in the EMU."'" It commenced on January 1, 1994, as specified by
Article 109e of the EC Treaty.5" The European Monetary Institute
("EMI")53 began operating at the beginning of this stage. 4 The EMI
45. See id.
46. See id. at 26.
47. See Barber, supra note 33, at 5.
48. See id.
49. Currie, supra note 18, at 26.
50. Id.
[A] monetary union requires the pooling of monetary sovereignty, not mon-
etary cooperation, the limits of which were the root problem of the EMS.
Given pooled monetary policy [and a single currency] the EMU could not be
subject to foreign exchange speculation of the kind that brought down the
EMS, any more than could the sterling value of the Scottish pound.
Id.
51. See Wepman, supra note 37, at 251 n.33 (citing Lionel Barber, Not a Bible, But
a Primer for Single Currency, Fin. Times, May 31, 1995, at 2).
52. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 109e ("The second stage for achieving economic
and monetary union shall begin on 1 January 1994.").
53. Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 38, at 107 ("[The] most important feature [of the
second stage] was the establishment in Frankfurt of a transitional monetary institu-
tion, the European Monetary Institution (EMI), the predecessor to a permanent insti-
tution, the European Central Bank . . ").
54. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 109f ("At the start of the second stage, a Euro-
pean Monetary Institute ... shall be established and take up its duties . . .
The Treaty provides that:
The EMI shall:
-strengthen co-operation between the national central banks;
1992 [Vol. 66
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replaces the committee of the central bank governors as the formal
cooperation mechanism for EU monetary policy.-" The EMI is also
responsible for the general oversight of the preparations made for the
EMU. 56
Stage Two requires Member States to meet certain requirements
concerning the size of government deficits, interest rates, and price
and currency stability.57 The criteria are vital to attaining a "sustaina-
ble financial position" to progress to Stage Three.58 These criteria
were designed to create a credible, solid economic foundation for the
-strengthen the co-ordination of the monetary policies of the member-States,
with the aim of ensuring price stability;
-monitor the functioning of the European Monetary System;
-hold consultations concerning issues falling within the competence of the
national central banks and affecting the stability of financial institutions and
markets;
-take over the tasks of the European Monetary Co-operation Fund...;
-facilitate the use of the ECU and oversee its development, including the
smooth functioning of the ECU clearing system.
Id art. 109f(2).
55. See Currie, supra note 18, at 26-27.
56. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 109f(3):
For the preparation of the third stage, the EMI shall:
-prepare the instruments and the procedures necessary for carrying out a
single monetary policy in the third stage;
-promote the harmonisation [sic], where necessary, of the rules and practices
governing the collection, compilation and distribution of statistics in the ar-
eas within its field of competence;
-prepare the rules for operations to be undertaken by the national central
banks within the framework of the ESCB [European System of Central
Banks];
-promote the efficiency of cross-border payments;
-supervise the technical preparation of ECU bank notes.
Id.
57. Ild. arts. 104c (requiring budgetary discipline), 109j (setting forth the four crite-
ria for the achievement of economic and monetary union); Wepman, supra note 37, at
251.
[1.] Each Member State's annual inflation and long-term interest rates must
be no more than 1.5 percent to two percent higher than the three best per-
forming Member States;
[2.] Each Member State's fiscal deficit must be no more than three percent
of its gross domestic product (GDP);
[3.] Each Member State's debt-to-income ratio must not exceed sixty percent
of its annual budget; and
[4.] Each Member State must not have devalued its currency under the Ex-
change Rate Mechanism within the intervening two years.
Id. The convergence criteria bring the various Member State economies closer and
prepare them for the full integration of their respective economies. See id. (summariz-
ing the Treaty of the European Union and Final Act, 7 Feb. 1992, Protocol on the
Excessive Deficit Procedure, Protocol on the Convergence Criteria referred to in Ar-
ticle 109j of the Treaty Establishing the European Community reprinted in Padoa-
Schioppa, supra note 10, at 270-72).
58. See Wepman, supra note 37, at 252.
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Euro, so that it would not be easily buffeted by inflation.59 The value
of this new currency would decline quickly if the Member States do
not comply fully with these criteria.60 Furthermore, after the intro-
duction of the Euro, the Member States will not be able to execute
independent monetary policy, 61 so it is in their interest to enter into
the EMU with healthy economies.62 Yves-Thibault de Silguy, the Eu-
ropean Commissioner with special responsibility for economic, mone-
tary, and financial affairs, has recently asserted that the Member
States have rapidly progressed towards economic convergence.63 He
concluded that the majority of the Member States should be ready to
participate in Stage Three on schedule.64
3. Stage Three: Centralization and the Euro
For eligible Member States, Stage Three will begin on January 1,
1999.65 The main thrust of this stage will be the centralization of all
economic and monetary power in the European Council and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank ("ECB").6 6 At this time, the Council will irrevo-
59. Association for the Monetary Union of Europe, EURO-Europe United
Through A Single Currency (visited Jan. 26, 1998) <http://amue.lf.net/q-alqa-engl.
htm> [hereinafter Europe United].
60. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
61. Currie, supra note 18, at 40-41.
62. Id.
63. Yves-Thibault de Silguy, Yves-Thibault de Silguy - A. Rapid Progress Has
Been Made Towards Economic Convergence (visited Jan. 26, 1998) <http:/eu-
ropa.eu.int/euro/en/silguy5/silguy5O2.asp?nav=en>.
Almost all the European Union countries already meet the criterion [for
inflation] laid down by the Treaty .... Government deficits have been sub-
stantially reduced in all Member States .... The other two criteria --
namely interest rates and exchange-rate stability - pose no particular prob-
lem .... Economic convergence is no longer a wish; it has become a reality
.... A majority of Member States should therefore be able to meet the
conditions laid down by the Treaty for participation in the euro when the
Commission and the EMI present their convergence reports next March.
Id.
64. See id. Mr. Ravasio, Director General for Economic and Financial Affairs of
the European Commission, testified to the United States Senate Budget Committee
to the same effect and asserted that the financial markets reflect the same. Europe's
Monetary Union and its Potential Impact on the United States Economy: Meeting
Before the Senate Budget Comm., S. Prt. 105-38, at 21, 24 (Com. Print 1997), available
in 1997 WL 654395, at *5-7 (F.D.C.H.) (statement by Giovanni Ravasio) [hereinafter
Ravasio Testimony].
65. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 109j(3)-(4) (setting forth the procedures for en-
tering into the third stage).
66. Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 38, at 120-29 (giving arguments for the centraliza-
tion of supervisory powers in the Monetary Union); see EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts.
105-09 (comprising the chapter on monetary policy); Wise, supra note 34, at 410("The third stage.., will be marked by the transferral [sic] of all economic and mone-
tary policy to EU institutions .... [T]he EU Council will be given power to decide
economic questions and impose constraints on national budgets. The ECB also will
decide all monetary issues . . ").
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cably fix the exchange rates of the old currencies against the Euro,67
and financial institutions will use the Euro instead of the participating
Member States' currencies.8 Additionally, the future ECB69 will take
over the functions of the EMI7 and the eligible Member States will
phase in the Euro.71
There are four significant dates for the process of implementing the
Euro.7 2 On July 1, 1998, the Council of Ministers' will select eligible
Member States-on the basis of the financial situation of each Mem-
ber State-to progress into the third stage of the EMU.74 On January
1, 1999, the conversion rates between the eligible currencies and the
Euro will be irrevocably fixed.75 At this time, the banking and finance
industry will begin using the Euro as a substitute for the eligible cur-
rencies.76 January 1, 2002 will mark the beginning of a six-month pe-
riod during which Euro-coins and Euro-notes will be in concurrent
67. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1091(4). A unanimous vote of the European
Council will fix the irrevocable conversion rates for the qualified currencies. Id. The
fixed conversion rates will establish how many Euros an obligation denominated in an
obsolete national European currency is worth. Id.
There is a risk of false exchange rates if the Council allows speculation to distort the
market value of qualified currencies. Currie, supra note 18, at 34-35; Wolfgang
Mtinchau, Foreign Exchange: Risks Aplenty When Converting 15 Into 1, Fin. Times,
Nov. 21, 1997, (EMU Survey) at 4 (describing exchange rate conversion as one of the
most risky aspects of the EMU and reporting that EU finance ministers decided on a
pre-announcement strategy to combat risks); Europe United, supra note 59. This dan-
ger can be averted, however, by using a rate close to the market rate or using the
average rate of a certain time period. Id
68. Currie, supra note 18, at 28-29.
69. The European Central Bank's primary function will be to guarantee monetary
stability and combat inflation throughout Europe. See Bruce Barnard, European Cen-
tral Bank to Play Leading Role, Eur. Mag., Sept. 1997, (Special Report) at 6 (discuss-
ing the characteristics and role of the future European Central Bank);
Hadjiemmanuil, supra note 38, at 133-38 (same); Vise, supra note 34, at 413-21
(same). The European Central Bank was modeled after Germany's Central Bank to
inspire market confidence. See The Interview - JosJ Marta Gil-Robles: What Will be
the Main Advantages of the Euro? (visited Jan. 26, 1998) <http.//europa.eu.int/euro/
en/stabiite/stab02.asp?nav=en> [hereinafter Main Advantages of the Euro].
70. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1091(1)-(2) (providing for the establishment of
the ESCB and the ECB, as well as for the liquidation of the EMI).
71. Currie, supra note 18, at 28-29.
72. The Madrid Council decided on these dates in December 1995. vulf H.
D6ser, EMU/Single Currency: What Does It Mean for Business, 11 J. Int'l Banking L.
503, 503-04 (1996).
73. The Council of Ministers is a European Union Institution composed of one
minister (cabinet member) from each Member State who has the authority to commit
his or her national government. EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 146. The Council shares
in the legislative and budgetary process. Id art. 145. It has the final say in passing
legislation and ensures coordination of the general economic and monetary policy of
the Member States. Id
74. See id art. 109j(4).
75. See id art. 109g.
76. Calendar, supra note 4, at 1.
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circulation with national currencies.77 The Euro will replace the na-
tional currencies by July 1, 2002.78
Although only eligible Member States will enter Stage Three in
1999,79 other Member States will still be able to join at a later date
once they qualify.8° The EC Treaty specifies the process through
which Member States may qualify for the single currency and mone-
tary union at a later date.8'
In conclusion, the Member States must all meet the same economic
requirements to enter the third and final stage of EMU. During the
third stage, Member States will phase in the single currency. The fol-
lowing section will survey the benefits, costs, and risks of the single
European currency and EMU.
B. Repercussions of the EMU and a Single Currency
Commentators have identified many different types of benefits and
consequences that may result from the monetary union and the intro-
duction of the Euro.82 Many have justified their enthusiasm by citing
various types of economic benefits such as decreased transaction costs
and increased competition.83 Others have expressed concerns about
short-term transition costs and the lack of fiscal policy freedom for the
77. Id.
78. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 14, 105a.
79. See id. art. 109j(4). For a discussion of the eligibility criteria, see Bruce Bar-
nard, Countdown to the Euro, Eur. Mag., Sept. 1997, (Special Report) at 8.
80. See EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 109k(2). The criteria for qualification will
remain the same:
At least once every two years, or at the request of a Member-State [wanting
to join the EMU] .... the Commission and the ECB shall report to the
Council in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 109j(1). Af-
ter consulting the European Parliament and after discussion in the Council,
meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or of Government, the
Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commis-
sion, decide which Member-States ... fulfil [sic] the necessary conditions on
the basis of the criteria set out in Article 109j(1).
Id.
81. See id.
82. For a thorough and detailed discussion of the impact of the Euro, the Associa-
tion for the Monetary Union of Europe has published an informational brochure,
entitled EURO-Europe United Through a Single Currency. It is available on the
Internet at <http://amue.lf.net/q-a/qa-engl.htm> (visited Jan. 26, 1998). For another
insightful article on the subject, see Wolfgang Miinchau, Life Will not be the Same
Under EMU, Fin. "imes, Nov. 21, 1997, at 1.
83. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The EMU and Fiscal Policy in the
New European Community: An Issue for Economic Federalism, 14 Int'l Rev. L. &
Econ. 147, 148-49 (1994) (arguing that the benefits will be fourfold: lower transaction
costs, greater overall price stability, further market integration, and increased capital
formation); Niels Thygesen, Why is Economic and Monetary Union an Important Ob-
jective for Europe?, 14 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 133, 134-35 (1994) (stating that in the
1990s the Europeans have come to perceive that the benefits of a single currency
outweigh its costs, with many benefits being microeconomic in nature).
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individual Member States.' On the whole, however, the expected ad-
vantages outweigh the concomitant risks and inconveniences.ss
One of the most immediate benefits of a single currency will be a
decrease in transaction costs.8 6 With a single currency, costs associ-
ated with exchanging currency, such as currency exchange commis-
sions' and currency fluctuation risks,'m will disappear.89 Thus, not
only will transactions between Member States be simplified, they will
be cheaper. 90 As transactions become more efficient, businesses may
84. See infra text accompanying notes 119 and 131; Paul Krugman, Second
Thoughts on the EMU, in Japan, Europe, and International Financial Markets: Ana-
lytical and Empirical Perspectives 34 (Ryuzo Sato et al. eds., 1994) (arguing that the
economic benefits of the EMU will not be significant enough to warrant enthusiasm);
Valenti, supra note 42, at 1061 (stating that "[w]hile currency unification may poten-
tially have many benefits, '[t]here is no categorical or unconditional reason to con-
clude that a monetary union is preferable to a flexible exchange regime'" (footnote
omitted)).
[M]ovement toward a single currency limits the fiscal policy options of the
EEC [sic] Member States and essentially handcuffs them in their attempts to
react to supply and demand shocks in their own economies. Currency unifi-
cation will also result in the loss to the EMS Member States of an important
policy instrument, namely the ability to control national currency in order to
exert influence over the national economy .... Losing control over mone-
tary policy can have harsh effects on a country's economy.
Id. at 1062 (footnotes omitted).
85. See Europe United, supra note 59 ("[T]he expected advantages clearly out-
weigh the inconveniences EMU involves. Otherwise, the creation of the EMU would
not have gained the far reaching support of politicians as well as economic and finan-
cial decision makers.").
86. Currie, supra note 18, at 55.
87. These are commissions paid by the exchanger to institutions who exchange
currencies for their customers. See Valenti, supra note 42, at 1049 ("[A] tourist could
traverse the entire region of the EEC [sic], passing through country after country,
without ever having to exchange currency.").
88. A currency fluctuation risk arises when someone must exchange his or her
domestic currency at a future date for a fixed amount of foreign currency (e.g., to pay
a debt). Currie, supra note 18, at 55-56. Where the value of the foreign currency
increases, more domestic currency must be exchanged to obtain the fixed amount of
foreign currency, thereby increasing the cost of exchanging the currency. See Valenti,
supra note 42, at 1049 ("[B]ankers could lend and borrow throughout the region with
concern only for credit risk and not exchange-rate risk." (footnote omitted)).
89. Currie, supra note 18, at 55-57.
90. See Dtser, supra note 72, at 506 (explaining that "[fjirst and foremost, there
will be no issue of 'permitted' contract currencies or the mandatory use of national
currencies, as is presently the case in Germany with respect to domestic transactions.
Numerous statistical and even exchange control requirements will disappear, repre-
senting a substantial savings in manpower"); Main Advantages of the Euro, supra note
69 ("[Tjhe costs of foreign exchange and currency risk hedging will instantaneously
disappear. Such costs are far from negligible.").
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transact more profitably. 91 This will lead to an eventual reduction in
prices and a proportional increase in consumer purchasing power.92
European trade unions support the EMU and the single currency
because of its projected impact on employment. 93 After conducting
economic research, the trade unions have concluded that a timely im-
plementation of the third stage of the EMU "can only have a positive
effect on employment in the long term."94 They attribute the long-
term benefits, such as the reduction of unemployment, to the dynam-
ics of an economic and monetary union and the convergence of the
Member States' economies. 95
The Euro and the EMU will likely increase competition among the
businesses of the Member States,96 provide price stability,97 and stim-
ulate economic growth. 98 Jos6 Maria Gil-Robles, President of the Eu-
ropean Parliament,99 confirmed that the Euro will maximize the
benefits of the single market for EU citizens by increasing overall
competition among the participating Member States because the
prices of goods and services in different countries will, for the first
time, be more easily compared."' This is especially important in the
91. See Yves-Thibault de Silguy, Yves-Thibault de Silguy - 2. The Euro will Pro-
vide a Permanent Basis for a Culture of Stability in Europe (visited Jan. 26, 1998)
<http://europa.eu.int/euro/en/silguy7/sil704.asp?nav=en> [hereinafter Culture of Sta-
bility] (predicting that "the euro will cut business costs, simplify business management
and facilitate exports").
92. See Europe United, supra note 59 ("The elimination of... costs [linked to the
multiplicity of currencies] will help reduce prices and raise the purchasing power of
the consumer proportionately .... The market becomes more transparent [with a
single currency] .... Due to increased competition, this also means lower prices."
(emphasis omitted)).
93. Peter Coldrick, European Trade Unions Say "Yes" to the Euro (visited Jan. 26,
1998) <http://europa.eu.int/euro/en/coldricklcoldrick.asp>. Mr. Coldrick is an econo-
mist at the European Trade Union Confederation. Id.
94. Id. Job creation will increase as the EMU encourages economic growth. Id.
95. "It is not the single currency -- the euro -- which is going to resolve the
problems of European economic deficits or unemployment but the economic and
monetary union dynamics which underpin it, and the broad movement towards the
convergence of national economies, stability and growth." Id.
96. See Europe United, supra note 59.
97. See Culture of Stability, supra note 91.
98. See Main Advantages of the Euro, supra note 69.
99. The European Parliament is the democratic institution of the European
Union. See Bermann, supra note 11, at 63-68.
100. See Main Advantages of the Euro, supra note 69; Yves-Thibault de Silguy,
Yves-Thibault de Silguy - 1. More Efficiency on the Single Market (visited Jan. 26,
1998) <http://europa.eu.intleuro/enlsilguy7/sil703.asp?nav=en>.
Free competition is essential for the smooth operation of the large internal
market. Yet obstacles to competition arise where consumers have difficul-
ties in comparing prices.
The Euro will make it quick and easy to compare prices. This will step up
competition .... With more transparent competition, it will be easier for
businesses to maximise [sic] the benefits resulting from their efforts to in-
crease competitiveness and thereby to increase their share of the market.
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market for durable goods, such as automobiles or machinery.101 Cur-
rently, prices stated in currencies unfamiliar to potential buyers mask
a price differential.10 2 The new price transparency will make the mar-
ket more efficient by eliminating geographic price differentials
through competition. 3
Furthermore, enthusiasts have touted the Euro's ability to increase
the stability of the international monetary system."° The Euro will
flow into international reserve holdings'015 gradually as it gains credi-
bility. 106 As more central banks hold the Euro instead of the
Deutsche Mark ("DM") as a reserve currency, the Euro will play a
role similar to that of the U.S. dollar. 107 The Euro may help to bal-
ance the international monetary system.les Indeed, Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, recently explained to the Sen-
101. Id.
102. Id. Consumers have difficulty comparing prices if they are quoted in two dif-
ferent currencies. See Valenti, supra note 42, at 1049 ("[After currency unification,]
consumers could directly compare prices for goods in two separate countries.").
103. This will also affect American-based multinationals doing business in Europe.
One article describes the effect of the new transparency:
[EMU] has major competitive issues .... Suddenly, for the first time, [Euro-
pean] customers are going to be able to see at what prices [the multination-
als] are selling [their] product in every country in Europe. They've always
been able to do that, but they've been looking at different currencies and
probably different discount structures. Now, for the first time, they'll be able
to shop around in a common currency and therefore, by doing much less
work, be able to see whether they should buy a particular part in the U.K.
rather than Germany. That will drive the customer toward the source where
[the multinationals] are probably making the least profit.
Yerak, supra note 5, at 1H (quoting Mark J.D. Jarrad, International Vice-President
for Finance and Administration for Parker Hannifin Corp.).
104. See Robert J. Guttman, An Interview with Yves-Thibault de Silguy, Eur. Mag.,
Sept. 1997, (Special Report) at 9; International Impact of the Euro - An Increasingly
International Euro (visited Jan. 26, 1998) <http'/europa.eu.int/euro/enimpactim-
pact03.asp?nav=en> [hereinafter International Impact of the Euro].
105. See Lawrence S. Ritter et al., Principles of Money, Banking, and Financial
Markets 174 (9th ed. 1997) (explaining the function of international reserves). "In
general, countries use their international reserves ... to bridge temporary gaps be-
tween the receipt and expenditure of funds, to tide them over periods when inflows of
funds are slack, and to meet unexpected or emergency needs." Id.
106. See International Impact of the Euro, supra note 104.
107. See Europe United, supra note 59; International Impact of the Euro, supra note
104 (noting percentage of holdings relative to the dollar will increase).
In recent years volatility between the major anchor currencies (Dollar - DM
- Yen) has escalated, causing problems not only for the European Market.
One of the reasons for this instability is the fact that the D-Mark [sic] has
gained importance as an international anchor currency. Yet the economic
weight of the DM is insufficient to support currency shifts on the financial
markets. The Euro currency area, with an economic weight which equals the
dollar would correspond to the importance of the euro in world trade.
Europe United, supra note 59.
108. See International Impact of die Euro, supra note 104; Europe United, supra
note 59 ("A deeper and [more] unified financial market would help stabilise [sic]
exchange rates between the main international currencies, which is also an advantage
for the United States and Japan.").
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ate Budget Committee that "it is conceivable that the Euro will rise as
a significant currency in the world, and that's good, not bad .... [T]o
have numbers of strong major currencies in the world [is to have] very
important anchors to international prosperity."'10 9
The introduction of the Euro also represents a step toward Europe
becoming a more effective political actor in the international realm.' 0
Increased economic integration requires Member States to work to-
gether in the long term."' Through the process of increased eco-
nomic convergence, Member States will learn how to cooperate even
more closely." 2 This has the potential of creating consensus in other
important policy areas." 3 As a result, Member States will be able to
make decisions and take actions more effectively in the international
arena.
114
As the above quote from the Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve
indicates, the United States has responded favorably to the prospect
of the European Union's single currency." 5 As long as the EMU and
the single currency strengthen the European economy, the United
States will also benefit." 6 Europe is an important trading partner and
the United States economy would profit from an increased European
demand for United States exports, which would result from European
In the initial transitional period, however, one commentator did identify a risk of
exchange rate instability. Currie, supra note 18, at 52-53 (explaining two scenarios
which may induce international currency instability temporarily: (1) a dollar overhang
caused by countries adjusting their international reserve portfolios; and (2) bad mone-
tary policy decisions by an inexperienced and politically independent ECB).
109. Greenspan Testimony, supra note 19, at *41.





115. See Martin Walker, The Euro: The View from America, Eur. Mag., Sept. 1997,
(Special Report) at 13-14 (reporting President Clinton's "relaxed and supportive ap-
proach" towards the EMU and the Euro); Europe's Monetary Union and its Potential
Impact on the United States Economy: Meeting Before the Senate Budget Comm., S.
Prt. 105-38, at 6-9 (Com. Print 1997) (statement by Lawrence H. Summers), available
in 1997 WL 14153282, at *8 [hereinafter Summers Testimony]. This testimony can
also be obtained on the Internet. See Larry Summers, U.S. Attitude Towards EMU
(visited Jan. 26, 1998) <http://amue.lf.net/news/newslet.27/nl27-9.htm>.
116. See Summers Testimony, supra note 115, at 13 ("[If EMU works for Europe, it
will work for the United States. The more the single currency helps Europe develop a
robust and healthy economy that is open to world markets, the more welcome the
project will be.").
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economic growth and increased employment.' 17 Furthermore, United
States consumers benefit from competitive European imports.1 1
Although both Member States and other countries will likely bene-
fit from the Euro, there are also costs and risks that should be recog-
nized. First and foremost are the costs of the EMU. European trade
unions are concerned that the restructuring necessary to accommo-
date the single currency will have short-term repercussions for em-
ployment in some sectors.'1 9 For governments, the restructuring costs
include the cost of producing the Euro-notes and coins, which will cost
over 0.25% of the combined gross domestic product ("GDP") of the
Member States in the first year. 120 This is equal to the projected sav-
ings in transaction costs.' 21 The currency production costs, however,
will decline in the following years, whereas the savings in transaction
costs will continue on a long-term basis.' Other governmental re-
structuring costs include national government-sponsored information
campaigns"2 and changes in accounting systems. 24 The costs of ad-
justing to the Euro for businesses and banks include changing ac-
counting systems,1' software, 26 stock control, 27 price labeling,'2
117. This idea was expressed by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve in his testi-
mony to the Senate in January 1998. "As far as [the United States is] concerned, to
the extent that [the European Union is] successful [with the EMU]. it's helpful to [the
United States]. To the extent that Europe grows faster, becomes a more effective
economy, they become an important trading partner of the United States." Greenspan
Testimony, supra note 19, at *41.
118. Summers Testimony, supra note 115, at 10.
119. See Coldrick, supra note 93.
120. See Europe United, supra note 59.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Coldrick, supra note 93. "It is the task of politicians to keep the general public
better informed .... The general public must be persuaded that EMU will represent
a zone of stability, growth and employment. The euro is also, perhaps above all, a
matter of confidence." Id.
124. See Europe United, supra note 59.
125. Id.
126. See Money Changers: Firns Adjust to New Euro Currency, Crain's N.Y. Bus.,
Mar. 2, 1998, at 37 (noting that "[t]o accommodate the new monetary unit, virtually
every firm doing business in Europe will have to make systems changes, the complex-
ity of which could dwarf even those for the year 2000"); Yerak, supra note 5, at 1H
("The launch of the common currency - the euro - by the European Monetary Union
(EMU) could begin on Jan. 1, 1999. And it could make the much-dreaded computer
upgrades for the year 2000 look like child's play, some say. 'This is potentially much
bigger, and it will happen much earlier than the 2000 time bomb."' (quoting Mark
J.D. Jarrad, International Vice-President for Finance and Administration for Parker
Hannifin Corp.); Ben Pring, EMU Compliance Dwarfs Importance of the Year 2000
Problem (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http://advisor.gartner.comfinbox/articlesarticle 2-
3a.html> ("The cost of EMU compliance is predicted to be three times that of adapt-
ing systems for the year 2000 transition.").
127. See Europe United, supra note 59.
128. Id.
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and the currency distribution system. 129 Additionally, some jobs in
the banking sector will be eliminated. 130
Second are the problems associated with the delegation of sover-
eignty in the monetary and fiscal policy fields. The individual Mem-
ber States will no longer be able to employ independent monetary
policy in response to economic problems.' 31 Furthermore, the stabil-
ity pact greatly diminishes the available flexibility of the fiscal policy
changes a Member State may make. 132 Government borrowing, often
utilized in times of economic recession, is restricted by the stability
pact to three percent of the Member States' GDP. 13 3 Member States
are subject to penalties if they run higher deficits. 134 Consequently,
Member States will have to cut government spending and/or increase
taxes to stay within the defined deficit limits during a recession,135
which may exacerbate unemployment and economic stability.' 36
Therefore, the EMU makes structural reforms in Europe even more
necessary.
37
II. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF AND DISCONTENTMENT WITH THE EURO
The introduction of the Euro potentially affects all transatlantic
supply contracts that have payment terms denominated in a European




132. See Currie, supra note 18, at 51 (reporting that "the stability pact sets out fines
for deficits in excess of 3% of GDP, unless corrective action is put in place to bring





137. Summers Testimony, supra note 115, at 7. Structural reforms include re-
forming national tax and income transfer systems, as well as regulations and legisla-
tion concerning entitlements. See Currie, supra note 18, at 86.
In order to reap the full benefits of monetary union, and thus spread growth
rather than stagnation abroad, the European Union must further liberalize
its economy. The labor market in particular must be liberalized in order to
instill greater wage flexibility and worker mobility, thereby reducing the
overall rate of unemployment. Deregulation, privatization and fiscal reform
would also add flexibility to the economy. Without progress on this front,
European growth would be sluggish and unemployment would remain high.
Europe's Monetary Union and its Potential Impact on the United States Economy:
Meeting Before the Senate Budget Comm., S. Prt. 105-38, at 36 (Com. Print 1997),
available in 1997 WL 654402, at *5-6 (F.D.H.C.) (statement by C. Randall Henning,
American University & Institute for International Economics).
138. The magnitude of this problem is unknown because actual contract terms are
not public, as such information would compromise the future bargaining positions of
the contracting parties. Most likely, the party with the most bargaining power will try
to avoid carrying the currency risk. Telephone Interview with David W. Detjen, Esq.,
Partner at Walter, Conston, Alexander & Green, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Feb. 20,
1998) [hereinafter Detjen Telephone Interview]. Bargaining power is usually a func-
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for a currency alteration. 14° Long-term contracts in particular will be
affected because they may not have anticipated a currency alteration.
This part discusses examples of contracts that may be affected by
the introduction of the Euro. Then, this part presents two hypotheti-
cal situations in which parties could use the fixed exchange rate of the
obsolete currency to the Euro to assert that changed circumstances
justify an excuse of contractual obligations. A survey of legislative
acts that have responded to the introduction of the Euro then follows.
Finally, this part discusses potentially available doctrines of excuse
that could apply.
A. Affected Transatlantic Commercial Contracts
A survey of corporate contracting practices indicates that most
companies have used long-term contracts in the course of business at
least once. 141 As more and more companies have entered the interna-
tional realm in their business transactions,1 42 the use of long-term con-
tracts with European suppliers or buyers has become more likely.
The issue of continuity of contracts could arise in a contract where,
for example, a U.S. company agrees with a French firm to provide
tion of the party's size and purchasing power. Id. Thus, a large European buyer may
be able to bargain with a small American supplier to pay in a European currency. Id.
Usually, European suppliers invoice in their currency and expect the buyers to carry
the exchange-rate fluctuation risk, precisely the type of obsolete currency provision
discussed by this Note. Id.
As a default rule for currency payment provisions, the UNIDROIT Principles pro-
pose that the currency of the place of payment will be used. International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Principles of International Commercial
Contracts arts. 6.1.9, 6.1.10 (1994) (setting forth rules for currency of payment) [here-
inafter UNIDROIT Principles]. Article 6.1.10 states that "[w]here a monetary obliga-
tion is not expressed in a particular currency, payment must be made in the currency
of the place where payment is to be made." Id. Thus, when the place of payment is in
a EMU Member State, the payment currency will most likely be in a European
currency.
139. Calendar, supra note 4. As noted above, states that do not initially qualify
may still join at a later date when they do qualify. Therefore, the issue of continuity
of contracts may still arise many years from now as Member States, which did not
originally qualify, do join and phase in the Euro. See supra note 80; Yerak, supra note
5, at 1H ("Some countries might come in in 2003, and there could be a transition for
those countries. That means the process will continue for many years." (quoting Les
Vinney, Treasurer for B.F. Goodrich)).
140. David Southern, Alteration of the Currency, 4 Eur. Fin. Serv. L 27, 27 (1997)
("An alteration of the currency exists if its basis is altered due to the legislator's con-
sciously building a new monetary system on a new unit of account.").
141. See Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 Wis.
L. Rev. 1, 16 (reporting that 89.2% of the companies surveyed, which were large com-
panies, responded that they entered into long-term contracts to buy or sell products
or services). The survey defined "long-term" as more than one year. Id.
142. In 1995, worldwide trade amounted to six trillion dollars. Alex Y. Seita,
Globalization and the Convergence of Values, 30 Cornell Int'l LJ. 429,440 (1997). For
an explanation of the mechanisms producing such large international economic flows
of goods and capital, see id. at 439-47.
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long-term metal reclamation and mill services. 1 43 Additional exam-
ples of long-term transatlantic contracts are found in the manufactur-
ing industry. Airbus, a European airplane manufacturer, agreed to
build and deliver 50 to 150 airplanes to Northwest Airlines in the
United States by 2003.1' Fuji's American plant contracted to provide
four major European manufacturers with lawnmower engines on a
long term basis.145 In another recent example, Galaxy Tire Co., Inc.,
entered into long-term arrangements with four European tire makers
to ensure its supply of tires for the next five years. 46
In all of the above examples, if the buyers agreed to pay in a Euro-
pean currency, then the long-term contract could be subject to poten-
tial uncertainty when the Euro comes into circulation. Thus, the
introduction of the Euro may impact American parties to contracts
with European counterparties in two situations: (1) where the Ameri-
can seller bears the risk of exchange rate fluctuation, and (2) where
the American buyer bears the risk of exchange rate fluctuation. The
crucial issue is the currency, which was agreed upon for payment.
Whenever the mode of payment has been specified as a European
currency, which later is replaced by the Euro, and no provision deal-
ing with the conversion to the Euro has been included in the contract,
the continuity of the contract may be challenged. 147
B. Scenarios for Arguing for Excuse and Discharge
There are numerous reasons why a party to a sales contract denomi-
nated in an obsolete currency would not want to accept Euros.148 This
would most likely occur if the 1999 fixed exchange rate did not ade-
quately reflect the value of the currency as assessed at the time of
contract formation. This could cut against either the buyer or the
seller. In one scenario, the seller realizes a loss. In the second scena-
rio, the buyer is disadvantaged. Both are discussed more fully below.
143. For the Record: Contracts, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Feb. 5, 1997, at C14 (re-
porting a long-term French-American contract for metal reclamation and mill
services).
144. See Airbus Wins Aircraft Contracts, Rebounds From Boeing's Sole Source
Deals, Airline Fin. News, June 23, 1997 ("Airbus announced a memorandum of un-
derstanding June 19 [1997] with Northwest for 50 firm orders, plus options for 100
others.").
145. Fuji Heavy to Build More Engines in US, Comline Daily News Trans., Mar. 10,
1997 (reporting that the U.S. plant will fill a long-term supply contract providing
lawnmower engines to four major European lawnmower makers).
146. Jean Sisson, Galaxy Acts to Secure Supply, Tire Bus., Aug. 18, 1997, at 1, 22(reporting that the U.S. company signed a five-year supply contract worth more than
$100 million with European tire manufacturers).
147. See Platt, supra note 6, at 5A.
148. The same problem will not exist when the contract is denominated in a cur-
rency that is not obsolete. The conversion of Euros, instead of an obsolete currency,
into dollars, for instance, would not involve the operation of the fixed Euro-obsolete
currency exchange rate.
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In the first case, the fixed exchange rate over-values the Euro as
compared to the valuation of the now obsolete currency specified in
the contract. 149 The Euro value at the time of payment would not
provide an adequate compensation to the seller. Thus, the seller will
likely not want to perform (supplying goods), because the value of the
buyer's performance (payment) has decreased.
In the example of a long-term contract to supply tires,150 for in-
stance, the European seller may not want to accept overvalued Euros.
The Euro value of the contract would be too low to reasonably com-
pensate the seller for the tires. The original contract could have deter-
mined that each tire would cost 100 DMs. When a relatively stable
DM / U.S. Dollar exchange rate is 1.00 DM for $0.75, the buyer and
seller assume that the equivalent dollar price will be $75.00. Assum-
ing the 1999 irrevocable fixed rate for 1.00 DM would be 0.50 Euros,
the tires will cost 50 Euros. If the exchange rate in the free market for
$1.00 is 2.00 Euros, one tire will cost the buyer $25.00, instead of the
expected $75.00. Thus, the value decreased by almost seventy per-
cent. The contract would be practically worthless, especially if the
seller expected to convert the Euros to Dollars at some later time.
The seller would want more Euros than the fixed exchange rate would
grant.
Such a case may arise from the very beginning of the circulation of
the Euro if the fixed rate is distorted by currency speculation' 5 pre-
ceding the date of the rate setting.152 Currency speculation after the
EMU could also cause the value of the Euro to decline over time, if
the EMU is not as successful in promoting economic growth, low in-
flation, and employment as the supporters of the EMU have pre-
dicted. 53 For example, currency traders may sell their Euro holdings
149. This Note assumes that the parties will apply the legally fixed exchange-rate to
determine how many Euros to pay.
150. See supra note 146.
151. Currency speculation is the practice of buying and selling currency based on its
expected future value to realize a profit by a rise or fall in exchange-rates. Black's
Law Dictionary 1399 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "speculation").
152. See supra note 67. Currency speculation can also cause an under-valuation.
See infra text accompanying note 156.
153. Testifying before the Senate Budget Committee, James A. Baker, former Sec-
retary of State and Treasury, speculated that creative accounting to squeeze marginal
countries in as original EMU Member States would weaken the Euro and increase the
value of the U.S. dollar.
The question in my mind is how much [the European Union] will have to
slide the objective standards that [the European union has] set for Monetary
Union in order to get there .... I really believe ... that [the European
Union] will do some creative accounting, which means that the Euro con-
ceivably could be a weaker currency than the Deutsche Mark, which could
give some impetus to the value of the dollar.
NATO Enlargemen, European Union Expansion and EMU: Policy Implications and
Debate: Hearing Before the Senate Budget Comm., S. Hrg. 105-333, at 87-88 (Com.
Print 1998), available in 1997 WL 676597, at *15 (F.D.C.H.).
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and instead buy Japanese Yen or U.S. Dollars. This would increase
the available supply of Euros and thus drive its relative value down.
Conversely, in the second case, a buyer under a contract denomi-
nated in an obsolete currency may wish to be excused from perform-
ance if the Euro is undervalued in comparison with the fixed exchange
rate set by law at the time of transition.154 The cost of performance
would have increased for the buyer, making the contract much more
expensive than expected.
To illustrate this scenario using the example of a long-term contract
for tires, the tires would be more expensive when the obsolete cur-
rency-Euro exchange rate undervalues the Euro. To review: the con-
tract for tires called for a price of 100 DMs per tire, which was
expected to be worth about $75.00 per tire (1.00 DM = $0.75). Let us
assume that the irrevocably fixed DM / Euro exchange rate is 1.00
DM for 5.00 Euros. When payment is due, the contract would be
worth 500 Euros. Where $1.00 is worth only 2.00 Euros on the open
market, the contract would actually cost $250.00, instead of the ex-
pected $75.00. Here, an undervaluation of the Euro increased the cost
of the tires by over 150%.
Such an undervaluation can occur if the Euro appreciates in value
over time in response to the outstanding success of the EMU.'55 Cur-
rency speculation could also cause Euro undervaluation by distorting
the fixed rate of exchange between the obsolete currency and the
Euro.156 For example, a currency speculator who anticipates that the
EMU will be successful in stimulating growth and employment may
try to buy European currency, anticipating an increase in value due to
the EMU. The currency speculator would sell his Japanese Yen or
U.S. Dollars to buy DMs. If many currency speculators act in this
way, the supply of European currency available for trade will de-
crease, in turn increasing the relative value of the European currency.
C. Legislative Acts to Ensure the Continuity of Contract
Jurisdictions which perceive themselves as most affected by the in-
troduction of the Euro have provided for contract continuity through
legislation.'57 All relevant legislation to date is in favor of preserving
154. See supra notes 67 and 75 and accompanying text.
155. See Currie, supra note 18, at 52-53 (discussing the possibility of a fall in the
value of the dollar against the Euro).
156. See supra note 67.
157. Dennis Keeling, The EMU Time Bomb, Mgmt. Acct., Sept. 1, 1997, at 34.
Legislation is being passed throughout Europe that will ensure that contracts
cannot be (broken) frustrated by the move from local currencies to the euro.
Already in the United States, states such as New York and California are
preparing legislation to accept the same principle of avoidance of frustration
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the continuity of contracts in connection with the introduction of the
single currency. 5 ' The European Union's Council has issued a bind-
ing regulation which provides for the continuity of contracts to as-
suage any fears of "walk-aways" in its jurisdiction. 59 New York' 60
and Ilinois 6 ' have passed substantially similar legislation. Further-
more, the California legislature is also considering passing such a
"EMU has the potential to create vexatious litigation. Such litigation and
any resulting uncertainty could threaten New York's stature in the world's
financial markets and cause such transactions to be entered into elsewhere -
most obviously in Europe."... In an effort to avoid this, legislation has
been proposed in New York to ensure that all relevant contracts get the
appropriate level of legal certainty.
Platt, supra note 6, at 5A (quoting from a memorandum for the Financial Markets
Lawyers Group written by Cravath, Swaine & Moore, a New York law firm).
158. See infra notes 159-61.
159. Council Regulation 1103/97, art. 3., 1997 O.J. (L 162) 1, 3.
Article 3
The introduction of the Euro shall not have the effect of altering any term of
a legal instrument or of discharging or excusing performance under any legal
instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate such
an instrument. This provision is subject to anything which parties may have
agreed.
Id.; see Yeowart, supra note 2, at 37-38 (reporting on the European legal framework
for the introduction of the Euro); Geoffrey Yeowart, Building a Solid Euro Frame-
work, Fm. Tunes, May 28, 1997, (EMU: An FT Guide) at 7 ("Article 3 will establish
that the introduction of the euro will not have the effect of altering any term of a
contract or discharging or excusing performance under a contract. Equally, it will not
give a party the right unilaterally to alter or terminate a contract.").
160. Continuity of Contract Act, N.Y. Gen. Oblig. L §§ 5-1601 to 5-1604 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1997). This new title provides that:
None of (a) the introduction of the Euro; (b) the tendering of Euros in
connection with any obligation... ; or (d) the calculating or determining of
the subject or medium of payment of a contract ... with reference to interest
rate or other basis has been substituted or replaced due to the introduction
of the Euro and that is a commercially reasonable substitute and substantial
equivalent, shall either have the effect of discharging or excusing perform-
ance under any contract ... or give a party the right to unilaterally alter or
terminate any contract ....
Id.; see also Gruson, supra note 7, at 100-07 (examining the New York Statute on the
Euro).
161. Euro Conversion Act, Pub. Act 90-268, 1997 Ill. Legs. Serv. 268 (West 1997).
In relevant section, it reads:
Section 10. Continuity of Contract. (a) If a subject or medium of payment of
a contract, security, or instrument is a currency that has been substituted or
replaced by the euro, the euro shall be a commercially reasonable substitute
and substantial equivalent that may be ... tendered ... at the conversion
rate specified in, and otherwise calculated in accordance with, the regula-
tions adopted by the Council of the European Union.
Id. § 5-1602.
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law. 1 62 This legislation reflects the view that the changeover to the
Euro should not disrupt commercial contracts. 163
D. Survey of Applicable Contract Law
In the United States, contract law is a matter of individual state
law. 1 64 Thus, state law will determine whether the Euro is a reason-
able substitute as a medium of payment. Although New York and
Illinois currently provide for continuity of contract through legislation,
not all affected contracts will be governed by these laws. Contracts
litigated under the law of states that have not passed continuity of
contract statutes may be vulnerable to judicial intervention and
discharge.' 65
In a state which has not adopted a continuity of contract statute,
there are various bodies of law which parties can elect to govern their
contract. These include the U.C.C.,1 6 6 the CISG,'1 67 and the
162. A.B. 185, Cal. Legis. 1997-98, Reg. Sess. (1997) (proposing to add Section 1663
to the Civil Code to assure continuity of contract) (passed by the California Assembly
on Sept. 3, 1997, and now being considered by the California Senate).
163. Platt, supra note 6, at 5A (discussing the New York legislation implemented to
protect contracts); Letter from Daniel P. Cunningham, Cravath, Swaine & Moore to
Alan H. Kaufman, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue 1 (Oct. 24, 1997) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review) ("When the legislation was submitted to the New York Legis-
lature in March 1997 it was accompanied by an Executive Summary which stated that
New York should adopt legislation concerning legal certainty and the introduction of
the Euro 'to ensure that all relevant contracts receive the appropriate level of legal
certainty."'); Memorandum for International Swaps and Derivatives Association from
Daniel P. Cunningham & Patricia L. Hogan, Cravath, Swaine & Moore 3 (Oct. 24,
1997) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) ("[T]he EMU Statute was intended to
address the legal uncertainty with respect to all relevant contracts .. ").
164. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 13 (3d ed. 1987)
(describing sources of contract law).
165. See Gruson, supra note 7, at 90-91 (explaining that there is a possibility that
"the substitution of the Euro for the old national currencies will make performance of
the contract denominated in an old national currency impossible or, in today's usage,
impracticable"); Gordon Platt, Euro Opens Door to Contract Confilsion, J. Com.,
June 23, 1997, at 5A. Mr. Gruson notes that the enactment of the New York con-
tinuity of contract legislation raised "serious doubts about the enforcement of obliga-
tions denominated in old national currencies and governed by the law of a state which
has not adopted a similar statute." Gruson, supra note 7, at 106.
Discharge occurs when parties are released from their contractual duties due to the
occurrence of an excusing event or by operation of law. See Black's Law Dictionary,
supra note 151, at 463 (defining "discharge"). "[A] party to a contract will be relieved
of his or her duty to perform when the objective purpose for performance no longer
exists. . . ." Id. at 670-71 (defining the "frustration of purpose doctrine").
166. Uniform Commercial Code (1977); see also infra notes 175-79 and accompany-
ing text (describing the applicability of the U.C.C.).
167. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 10, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 19 I.L.M. 668
(1980), microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/4:98-9 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office)
[hereinafter CISG]. There is a United States, a German, and a French on-line
database, each giving the full text of the treaty and reporting different cases and com-
mentary interpreting the treaty. Convention on the International Sale of Goods (vis-
ited Mar. 12, 1998) <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/> (in English); CISG Online (visited
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UNIDROIT Principles.' 68 Article Two of the U.C.C. governs con-
tracts for the sale of goods. 169 The CISG is a federal treaty which
governs contracts for the international sale of goods.17 0 As a treaty,
the CISG preempts conflicting state contract law.17 1 The UNIDROIT
Principles, while not a body of law, 172 are important because judges
often use them as a gap-filler when interpreting the CISG. t73 The
UNIDROIT Principles are also available as a set of default rules for
contracting parties to elect. 174
The relevant U.C.C. sections are applicable to transactions in
goods175 as long as they have a reasonable relationship17 6 to the forum
state. 177 Thus, a transatlantic long-term supply contract for goods may
be covered by the U.C.C. 178 A contract for industrial services, how-
ever, is not covered, because the contract lacks the "goods" element.
Mar. 12, 1998) <http://www.jura.uni-freiburg.deliprllcisgltitle.htm> (in German); Cis-
ginh (visited Mar. 12, 1998) <httpJ/vvv.jura.uni-sb.de/FB/LSWitz/cisg.htm> (in
French).
168. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Prin-
ciples of International Commercial Contracts (1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT
Principles].
169. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
171. See Henry Gabriel, Practitioner's Guide to The Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
11 (1994) (explaining that "[b]ecause the CISG is the law of the land under the
supremacy clause, the state law is preempted" (footnote omitted)); Amy A. Kirby,
Note and Comment, Punitive Damages in Contract Actions: The Tension Between the
United Nations Convention on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods and U.S.
Law, 16 J.L. & Com. 215, 216, 223-227 (1997) (discussing how courts should not apply
developments of U.S. common law concerning punitive damages in international sales
contract contexts which would be contrary to the CISG).
172. For a description of the history, nature, and success of the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples, see Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice - The Erpe-
rience of the First Two Years (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg
biblio/pr-exper.html>.
173. See Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-Filling Role of the Unidroit Principles in
International Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay Between the Principles and
the CISG, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 1149 (1995); infra note 336.
174. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
175. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977). "Goods" are defined by the U.C.C. as -all things...
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale . . . ." Id. § 2-
105.
176. Id. § 1-105 (providing that when a transaction also bears a reasonable relation
to another state or nation, the parties are free to elect the law of the other state or
nation to govern the transaction). To avoid going outside of the scope of this Note, I
will avoid conflicts of laws issues and assume that the parties have not exercised this
option.
177. Some states have adopted slightly altered versions of the U.C.C. and, conse-
quently, some outcomes may vary.
178. This is of course contingent upon a court's rulings on conflict of laws issues. In
a case where the parties opt out of the CISG and elect a state's version of the U.C.C.
as the governing law, this Note assumes that the court will apply the U.C.C.
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The U.C.C. allows parties to designate a different governing law in
their contract. 179
The scope of applicability of the CISG 8 0 is limited to the sale of
goods between parties located in participating signatory countries. 81
The CISG is valid, applicable law for international commercial con-
tracts for goods in the jurisdiction of United States, provided the other
contracting party is from another signatory state. 82 The nature of the
CISG is like that of the U.C.C. in that it applies unless the parties opt
for another set of rules or laws to govern their contract.'8 3
Unlike the U.C.C. and the CISG, which cover contracts for the sale
of goods unless the parties designate another governing law, the
UNIDROIT Principles only govern when the parties have selected
them as the governing law."8 The UNIDROIT Principles have a
broader coverage than either the U.C.C. or the CISG.' 85 The latter
two cover only contracts for the sale of goods, whereas the former can
also govern contracts for the sale of services.' 8 6 Parties may choose
the UNIDROIT Principles as the governing law in their international
179. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1977) (providing that "[t]he effect of provisions of this Act
may be varied by agreement").
180. See CISG, supra note 167, arts. 1-6; Albert H. Kritzer, Guide to Practical Ap-
plications of the United Nations Convention On Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods 11-13 (1989) (discussing the scope and the applicability of the CISG). For
example, the CISG was applied as the governing law in Delchi Carrier, S.p.A. v.
Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying the CISG when a foreign buyer
brought an action to recover lost profits as damages resulting from delivery of non-
conforming goods).
181. "The CISG is the uniform international sales law of countries that account for
over two-thirds of all world trade." Participating Countries: Current Status, Trends
(visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/cisgintro.html>. Contracting
(signatory) European Member States are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden.
CISG: Participating Countries (visited Mar. 12, 1998) <http://cisgw3.law.pace.
edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html>; [untitled] (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http://www.un.
org/Deptsfrreaty/finallts2/newfilesfpartboo/x_boox_10.html.> (listing participants,
dates, declarations, and reservations). Potentially all of these countries could intro-
duce the Euro in the near future.
182. Reed Kathrein & Daniel Magraw, Introduction, in The Convention for the
International Sale of Goods: A Handbook of Basic Materials 1 (Daniel Barstow
Macgraw & Reed R. Kathrein eds., 2d ed. 1990). This self-executing treaty came into
force on January 1, 1988. Id.
183. CISG, supra note 167, art. 6 sets forth: "The parties may exclude the applica-
tion of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of
any of its provisions."
184. See Garro, supra note 173, at 1163; Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles
of International Commercial Contracts: The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 281, 283 (1994) [hereinafter Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts] (noting that the UNIDROIT Principles are "not
intended for adoption as a treaty or uniform law; rather, the document is in the nature
of a restatement of the commercial contract law of the world").
185. See Garro, supra note 173, at 1152.
186. See id. at 1163 ("[T]he UNIDROIT Principles... are not limited to contracts
for the ... sale of goods. Instead [they] cover all other kinds of transactions.").
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contracts.'87 The UNIDROIT Principles are especially helpful when
they cannot agree on a governing national law."s
Hence, the U.C.C., the CISG, and the UNIDROIT Principles may
control or influence the outcome of litigation concerning transatlantic
commercial contracts. The following four sections will survey these
three bodies of law, specifically the provisions they afford for per-
formance and excuse due to changed circumstances causing commer-
cial impracticability.
1. The Duty to Perform
The parties contract to assure that they will either receive perform-
ance as promised or have a remedy, regardless of which body of law
governs. The U.C.C. embodies a duty to perform"8 9 by supplying
damages for non-performance and making the remedy of specific per-
formance available if appropriate. 1" The CISG also creates a duty to
perform, the breach of which entities the other party to various reme-
dies. 191 Similarly, the UNIDROIT Principles also contain a duty to
perform' 92 and set out remedies for the breach of this duty.193 The
discharge of a contract and the concomitant excuse from paying dam-
ages for non-performance is an exception to the general duty to per-
form as promised. 94 Thus, a contract will generally be enforceable
unless it is discharged under some applicable legal doctrine.
187. See Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Comnnercial Contracts,
supra note 184, at 283.
188. Id.
189. U.C.C. § 2-301 (1977) ("General Obligations of the Parties[:] The obligation
of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in
accordance with the contract.").
190. Id. §§ 2-701 to 725 (setting forth the available remedies).
191. CISG, supra note 167, arts. 28, 46, 62, 74-77 (sections on entitlements and
remedies); see also Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in Interna-
tional Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of tile Vienna Convention, 63
Wash. L. Rev. 607, 613 (1988) ("[T]he remedial provisions of the Convention establish
a clear right to performance for both buyers and sellers. Under these provisions, an
aggrieved party may choose either to require the breaching party fully to perform the
contract or to seek substitutional damages.").
192. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 168, art. 6.2.1. It provides that -[w]here
the performance of a contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that party
is nevertheless bound to perform its obligations subject to the following provisions on
hardship." Id. Articles 6.2.2, 7.2.1-2.5 set forth the right to performance. Id.
193. Id. arts. 7.4.1-4.13 (providing for damages).
194. See Gerhard Wagner, Essay, In Defense of tie Impossibility Defense, 27 Loy.
U. Chi. LJ. 55, 58 (1995).
Under current law, a party who fails to perform a contractual duty is in
breach of contract and must reimburse the other party for its expectation
damages. Common law generally equates non-performance of a contract
with breach, regardless of the promisor's reason for failing to perform his
contractual duty. Despite the strictness of this common law principle, the
doctrine of impossibility is well established in both English and American
common law. Under this doctrine, the promisor's failure to perform is ex-
cused if a supervening event renders performance impossible.
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Doctrines that relieve the parties from their duty to perform are
available under the U.C.C., the CISG, and the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples.'95 The U.C.C. provides for excuse from contractual obligations
under its section on impracticability. 9 6 The CISG has a provision
which excuses parties from liability for non-performance caused by an
impediment beyond a party's control.'97 The UNIDROIT Principles
allow for recourse when hardship alters the equilibrium of the
contract. 198
2. Uniform Commercial Code
The U.C.C. section which provides for excuse is U.C.C. Section 2-
615,199 under which a party alleges an excuse by invoking commercial
impracticability. 20 Although U.C.C. Section 2-615 only mentions sell-
ers in its text, U.C.C. Official Comment 9 expresses an intent to entitle
buyers to assert excuse under this section as well.20 ' Thus, contracting
parties can plead commercial impracticability under U.C.C. Section 2-
615 when presupposed conditions fail to occur."cu The four-part
test 20 3 for this section requires:
1) The occurrence of a supervening contingency;
2) the non-occurrence of the resulting contingency was a basic as-
sumption upon formation of the contract;
3) the occurrence of the contingency rendered the agreed perform-
ance impracticable; and
4) the occurrence of the contingency was not a risk assumed by the
204performing party.
Id.
195. See infra notes 200-57.
196. See infra Part II.D.1.
197. See infra Part II.D.2.
198. See infra Part II.D.3.
199. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977).
200. Jane Massey Draper, Impracticability of Performance of Sales Contract as a
Defense Under U.C.C. § 2-615, 93 A.L.R.3d 584, § 2 (1980). "Excuse" in this context
is "[a] matter alleged as a reason for relief or exemption from some duty or obliga-
tion." Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 151, at 566-67. "Commercial impracticabil-
ity" in this context is defined as "[a] broadened interpretation of the doctrine of
impossibility which holds that a party to a contract for the sale of goods will be re-
lieved of his or her duty to perform when the premise... on which the contract was
based no longer exists due to unforeseeable events." Id. at 756.
201. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 9 (1977); Draper, supra note 200, § 2.
202. For a precise explanation of the impossibility doctrine, see Calamari & Perillo,
supra note 164, at 536-540.
203. This test is supplemented by the code requirement of notice to the other party.
U.C.C. § 2-615(c) (1977).
204. See Steven Walt, Expectations, Loss Distribution and Commercial Impractica-
bility, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 65, 66 (1991); see also Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon
County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986) (not excusing utility from long-term,
fixed-price coal contract because the utility had assumed the risk); Iowa Elec. Light
and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding the energy crisis foreseeable and, thus,
refusing to consider whether performance had become impracticable); Eastern Air
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A judicial reformulation has developed which treats the second and
the fourth requirement set forth in the U.C.C. as essentially the
same." 5 Thus, there are three inquiries by which a court evaluates
any event to determine whether it meets the requirements of U.C.C.
Section 2-615. First, there must be an actual occurrence of an event or
contingency which renders performance impracticable."0 6 Second, the
party seeking an excuse must establish that the event or contingency
was unforeseeable and not allocated by the parties.2 7 A determina-
tion of foreseeability does not require absolute foreseeability, rather,
it is a question of degree.208 An absolute approach would rule out any
event that was even remotely foreseeable by anyone.20 Courts have
held that an absolute interpretation of foreseeability would be too
narrow.210 In Opera Co. of Boston v. Wolf Trap Foundation for the
Performing Arts,z1' the court enunciated the following test for foresee-
ability: "whether the non-occurrence of the event was sufficiently un-
likely or unreasonable to constitute a reason for refusing to apply the
doctrine. '2 12 Foreseeability is an essential element of the inquiry be-
cause it is an objective means of ascertaining whether the parties in-
tended to allocate the risk.213 What sorts of events have been
foreseeable? A drought that caused crop failures has been found not
to be foreseeable.214 The international oil crisis of the early 1970s, on
the other hand, was found to be foreseeable. 15
Third, the event or contingency must actually have rendered per-
formance impracticable. 2 6 A mere increase in the cost of perform-
Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (not excusing perform-
ance where the United States government interfered with oil prices during an oil cri-
sis); Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1976) (finding
that a failure to attempt to find a substitute method of performance undermined the
plaintiffs claim of impracticability).
205. See Walt, supra note 204, at 66.
206. Draper, supra note 200, § 2. This is a question of evidentiary proof and is
outside of the scope of this Note.
207. Id
208. Opera Co. of Boston v. Wolf Trap Found. for the Performing Arts, 817 F.2d
1094, 1100-02 (4th Cir. 1987); L.N. Jackson & Co. v. Royal Norwegian Gov't, 177 F.2d
694, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1949).
209. Wolf Trap, 817 F.2d at 1100-02.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1094.
212. Id. at 1102.
213. Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 1985)(explaining that "[b]ecause the purpose of a contract is to place the reasonable risk of
performance upon the promisor,... [the promisor] is presumed to have agreed to
bear any loss occasioned by an event that was foreseeable at the time of contracting").
214. Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 861 F.2d 650, 653-54 (11th Cir. 1988)
(stating that drought which caused peanut crop to fail was unforeseeable); Alimenta
(U.S.A.), Inc. v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Canada) Ltd., 802 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1lth Cir. 1986)
(same).
215. See infra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
216. Draper, supra note 200, § 2.
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ance will usually not be severe enough to merit excuse.2 17 The
increase in costs must be unreasonable and unexpected and, thus,
outside a realm of cost increase possibly anticipated in the contract.
2 18
It is an objective, not a subjective determination.2 19
To fall under U.C.C. Section 2-615, performance must be impracti-
cable.22 ° The U.C.C. does not give any guidance on the definition of
"impracticable. '22 ' This leaves the issue open for judicial interpreta-
tion and requires litigants to resort to common law arguments.2 2 The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts is persuasive in defining "imprac-
ticable."'  Section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, en-
titled "Discharge by Supervening Impracticability, 2 24 delineates one
formulation of commercial impracticability. Section 261 requires the
parties to have assumed in their contract the non-occurrence of an
unforeseeable event causing the alleged impracticability."z
U.C.C. Section 2-615 will not excuse a contracting party for imprac-
ticability when substitute performance is possible under U.C.C. Sec-
tion 2-614.126 Thus, section 2-614 limits the application of section 2-
615.227 Under section 2-614, the parties are bound to tender and ac-
cept reasonable substitutes.22 8 The duties and rights embodied in sec-
217. D.H. Blattner & Sons, Inc. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995); infra note 276.
218. See Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979).
219. Cargill, 861 F.2d at 652.
220. See Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985)
(excusing a contractor which could not possibly comply with company specific
mechanical characteristics); International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770
F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985) (excusing buyer when it no longer had any use for gas be-
cause of environmental regulations).
221. Walt, supra note 204, at 65-66 (noting that "[iln fact the official comment states
that section 2-615 'deliberately refrains from any effort at an exhaustive expression of
contingencies and is to be interpreted in all cases sought to be brought within its scope
in terms of its underlying reason and purpose').
222. See Draper, supra note 200, § 2.
223. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261.
224. Id. It states that:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render




226. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977); Draper, supra note 200, § 5 (discussing the tender of
substitute performance).
227. Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 1976) (finding
that a failure to attempt to find a substitute method of performance undermined the
plaintiff's claim of impracticability).
228. U.C.C. § 2-614(1) (1977) (obligating seller to use, and buyer to accept, substi-
tute performance by commercially reasonable means when the method of perform-
ance specified in the contract becomes impracticable); Draper, supra note 200, § 5.
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tion 2-614 apply to both sellers and buyers. 29 Section 2-614(2) gives
sellers a right to withhold or stop delivery when the manner of pay-
ment fails due to government regulations.230
The following example shows how a party to a transatlantic contract
might try to employ the U.C.C. to argue for a discharge of their con-
tractual obligation to perform. Under the U.C.C., when a seller does
not want to accept Euros as payment because the Euros are weaker
than the expected former European currency, he or she can try to
plead commercial impracticability. The seller would argue that the
value of such a payment would not cover the seller's costs. If delivery
has already been taken, the disadvantaged seller could argue that pay-
ment in Euros will not discharge the obligation because the 1999 fixed
rate is a "discriminatory, oppressive, or predatory" governmental
regulation.231
Likewise, a disadvantaged buyer who does not want to make a pay-
ment in Euros could argue impracticability of performance. Under
U.C.C. Section 2-615, the buyer would argue that the cost of the con-
tract is overly burdensome because the Euro price of the contract is
dramatically higher than originally expected, making payment com-
mercially impracticable.
Hence, both buyers and sellers may try to be excused from their
contractual obligations under the U.C.C. when unexpected circum-
stances cause commercial impracticability. The party asserting excuse
must show impracticability, non-assumption of the risk, and that the
event causing impracticability was not foreseeable. 2 The following
section examines what a party must show when arguing for an exemp-
tion under the functional equivalent of U.C.C. Section 2-615 found in
the CISG.
3. Convention on the International Sale of Goods
Article 79 of the CISG excuses parties from liability due to com-
mercial impracticability.3 The Article exempts a party from liability
229. Thus, if a court accepts the Euro as a reasonable substitute for an obsolete
Member State currency, it would not excuse either the seller or the buyer from their
contractual obligations. See U.C.C. §§ 2-614, 2-615 (1977).
230. Id § 2-614(2) (1977).
231. Id
232. See supra note 204.
233. CISG, supra note 167, art. 79 1 states that:
A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he
proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and
that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or... overcome it or its
consequences.
See also C.M. Bianca & MJ. Bonell, Commentary on the International Sales Law.
The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention 572-95 (1987) (analyzing CISG Article 79); John
0. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations
Convention 426-43 (1982) (same); Kritzer, supra 180, at 501-22 (same).
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for damages caused by non-performance where the party is not re-
sponsible. 234 The party asserting excuse must prove three elements:
(a) The failure was "due to an impediment beyond [the party's]
control";
(b) At the time of the contract [the party] "could not reasonably be
expected to have taken the impediment into account"; and
(c) Subsequent to the contract he could not reasonably be expected
"to have avoided or overcome [the obstacle] or its
consequences.,
235
Commentators argue that the wording is broad enough for judges to
be influenced by the excuse doctrines already existing in their respec-
tive jurisdictions."36 Thus, it is likely that the American common law
principle of impracticability might be applied to litigation in the
United States, but would not be applied by a German court interpret-
ing exactly the same section." 7 Merely applying domestic principles
would, however, disregard the international intent of the treaty.23 8
Rather, "[j]udicial construction should be guided by the necessity of
finding a balance between the two fundamental principles which gov-
ern the issue of exemption in international commercial law - security
of transactions and contractual justice." 9
234. CISG, supra note 167, art. 79(1); Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law: The
UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 101 (1986).
235. Honnold, supra note 233, at 427 (quoting from the CISG).
236. See Bianca & Bonell, supra note 233, at 594:
[Tihe general wording of Article 79 leaves much room for judicial interpre-
tation. The judge will have a natural tendency to refer to similar concepts in
his own law. Thus, the judge of a socialist country will have a restrictive
approach to force majeure. Judges in socialist countries will also have a pe-
culiar attitude with regard to strikes. On the contrary a common lawyer will
feel inclined to refer to the more flexible notions of frustration and impracti-
cability. In the Roman-German system, the judge will reason in terms of
force majeure. The risk of divergence thus exists and must not be
underestimated.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Kritzer, supra note 180, at 501-02 (making the same
assertion as Bianca-Bonell).
237. See Bianca & Bonell, supra note 233, at 594; Kritzer, supra note 180, at 501-02.
After comparing the CISG and the UCC, one commentator finds that the CISG is
more permissive than the common law, because it is much like the civil law approach
to frustration of purpose. Gabriel, supra note 171, at 241-42. He contends that, in
essence, the operation of the two codes are much the same, as the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts adopts a broad view concerning frustration of purpose. Id.
Incidentally, about half of all CISG cases, and most of the hardship cases have been
argued in German courts. Institute of Commercial Law, CISG Database: Country
Case Schedule (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/
casecit.html#us>.
238. See Bianca & Bonell, supra note 233, at 594-95; Honnold, supra note 233, at
429 n.3 (citing Barry Nicholas, Force Majeure and Frustration, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 231
(1979)).
239. Bianca & Bonell, supra note 233, at 595 (rejecting national law and compara-
tive law approaches in favor of a harmonized, uniform approach).
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Clear guidance in the form of judicial precedent on the application
of Article 79 has not yet been established, because very few contracts
governed by the CISG have been the subject of litigation.240 Accord-
ing to the Second Circuit, U.C.C. case law can be used to interpret a
CISG provision with identical language.24 1 Foreign courts and arbitra-
tors have already established decisions based on Article 79.242 An ar-
bitration case between an Austrian seller and a Bulgarian buyer
interpreted Article 79 as not excusing an impediment caused by gov-
ernment action which suspended the payment of foreign debts. 243 An
Italian court had occasion to interpret various CISG articles, including
Article 79, although the CISG did not directly govern the contract.2"
This Italian court found that a claim of hardship based on a thirty
percent price increase of the market price of steel would not justify a
party avoiding the contract.245 In another case of price increase in the
240. See Michael R. Will, International Sales Law under the CISG: The First 222 or
So Decisions, in Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (CISG) 211,218 (Cornell Int'l LJ. ed., 1995) [hereinafter Review of the CISGI
(reporting that CISG cases are only litigated one to three times a year in the United
States). So far, only six cases involving the CISG in the United States have been
decided. See Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027-28 (2d Cir.
1995) (explaining that "[b]ecause there is virtually no case law under the Convention,
we look to its language and to 'the general principles' upon which it is based"); Bei-
jing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178,
1182-83 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting the choice of law issue concerning the CISG,
though not resolving the issue on this appeal); Graves Import Co., Ltd. v. Chilewich
Int'l Corp., No. 92-Civ. 3655 (JFK), 1994 WL 519996, *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,1994);
Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., No. 88-CV-1078, 1994 WL 495787 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 1994) (applying Article 29 of the CISG); Fidanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l
Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that "[ajlthough there is as yet
virtually no U.S. case law interpreting the Sale of Goods Convention it may safely be
predicted that this will change" (citation omitted)); Orbisphere Corp. v. United
States, 726 F. Supp. 1344, 1355 n.7 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) (holding that "for interna-
tional contracts for the sale of goods between U.S. parties and foreign parties ... the
applicable commercial law is not the U.C.C., but rather the [CISG] .. ."). None of
these cases have interpreted CISG Article 79.
241. Delchi Carrier, 71 F.3d at 1028 (warning, however, that the U.C.C. case law is
not applicable per se (citing Orbisphere, 726 F. Supp. at 1355)).
242. See 2 Guide to the International Sale of Goods Convention 201.177 (William
A. Hancock ed., 1996); UNILEX International Case Law and Bibliography on the
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 164 (Michael Joa-
chim Bonell et al. eds., 1997).
243. ICC Arbitration Case No. 7197 of 1992 (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http.//
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cgi-bin/SFgate/cisgwaisfdblcases2/927197il.html;7=%00eCs>.
244. Nuova Fucinati S.p.A. v. Fondmetall Int'l A.B., Tribunale Civile di Monza,
Italy (Mar. 29, 1993) (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http.//cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cgi-biniSF-
gate/cisg/wais/db/cases2/930329i3.html;7=%00>. An English translation of the case
was published in Alessandra Michelini, Interpretive Decision Applying CISG:
Tribunale di Monza, Sentenza 14 Gennaio 1993, Laudisio Presidente, Lapertosa Esten-
sore, Nuova Fucinati S.p.A. (Aw. Bassi, Santamiaria) C. Fondinetall International (Aw.
Bianchi, Ginelli, Rossi), 15 J.L. & Com. 153 (1995).
245. Michelini, supra note 244, at 155 (explaining that the CISG "does not seem to
contemplate the remedy of dissolution of contract for supervening excessive
onerousness").
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steel market, an arbitrator decided that fluctuations in the market
price of steel were foreseeable. 46 In this decision, the arbitrator inti-
mated, however, that hardship caused by a sudden, substantial, and
unforeseeable price increase could qualify for exemption from liability
under Article 79.247 Thus, it is arguable whether commercial impracti-
cability could be a ground for exemption under the CISG.
4. The UNIDROIT Principles
In the UNIDROIT Principles, the relevant excuse section is found
in Article 6.2 and is entitled "Hardship."248 Unlike the mainstream
U.C.C. and Restatement versions of impracticability, hardship under
the UNIDROIT Principles usually does not excuse performance. 249
Rather, this subchapter compels the parties to renegotiate250 and au-
thorizes the court to reform the contract 51 to take the hardship into
account. Both the buyer and the seller have redress under this provi-
sion when the value or cost of performance changes such that the
"equilibrium of the contract" is fundamentally altered.-52 To invoke
this doctrine, a party must show that the events altering the equilib-
rium of the contract became known after contracting, and "could not
reasonably be taken into account,... are not within the party's con-
trol and the risk was not assumed." 3 Hence, the party asserting the
246. ICC Arbitration Case No. 6281 of 1989 (abstract) (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http:/
/cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cgi-bin/SFgate/cisg/wais/db/cases2/896281il.html;7=% 00>.
247. See id.
248. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 168, art. 6.2.1.
249. See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 168, art. 6.2.1. (providing that "[wihere
the performance of a contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that party
is nevertheless bound to perform its obligations subject to the following provisions on
hardship"); id. art. 6.2.3(2) ("The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle
the disadvantaged party to withhold performance.").
Professor Perillo has asserted that the hardship subchapter "appears to introduce
radical deviations from the common law." Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts, supra note 184, at 297.
250. See id. art. 6.2.3(1) ("In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to
request renegotiations. The request shall be made without undue delay and shall indi-
cate the grounds on which it is based.").
251. See id. art. 6.2.3(3)-(4) ("Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable
time either party may resort to the court. If the court finds hardship it may, if reason-
able, (a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed; or (b) adapt the
contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium.").
Court reformation of a contract is an "[e]quitable remedy used to reframe written
contracts to ... bring about a better result, correction or rectification." Black's Law
Dictionary, supra note 151, at 1281 (defining "reformation").
252. See Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
supra note 184, at 300.
253. Id. The relevant definition is found in UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 168,
art. 6.2.2, which defines hardship as a situation
where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the
contract either because the cost of a party's performance has increased or
because the value of the performance a party receives has diminished, and
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excuse must prove unforeseeability, non-allocation of the risk, and se-
verity of the hardship of at least a fifty percent price increase.2-3
Article 7.1.7 is another potentially relevant subchapter.255 This arti-
cle excuses performance when a party can prove complete impossibil-
ity-" 6 Arguably, this article does not cover altered exchange rate
situations because it only excuses non-performance on the ground of
total impossibility. 5
In summary, the introduction of the Euro has the potential of af-
fecting a wide variety of transatlantic commercial contracts. A buyer
obligated to pay in an obsolete European currency will likely argue
commercial impracticability where the Euro is undervalued in com-
parison to the old currency. A seller obligated to accept payment in a
European currency will likely argue commercial impracticability
where the Euro is overvalued. The U.C.C., the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, the CISG, and the UNIDROIT Principles all provide for
some form of excuse from contractual obligation for impracticability
due to unforeseeable circumstances. The next part of this Note argues
that, in the vast majority of cases involving the introduction of the
Euro, an assertion of commercial impracticability or hardship should
not succeed in discharging the contractual obligations.
(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the
conclusion of the contract;
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the
disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the contract;
(c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and
(d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party.
Id.
254. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 168, art. 6.2.2 cmt. 2 & illus. 1. For a de-
scription of the factual requirements for a finding of hardship, see Joseph M. Perillo,
Force Majeure and Hardship under the UNIDROIT Principles of International Com-
mercial Contracts, 5 Thl. J. Int'l & Comp. L 5,22-25 (1997) [hereinafter Perillo, Force
Majeure].
255. See Perillo, Force Majeure, supra note 254, at 22 nn. 103-04, 107.
256. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 168, art. 7.1.1.
257. See Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
supra note 184, at 300 ("The rule of force majeure is draconian and unforgiving.
Under the rule, nothing short of total impossibility will excuse non-performance or
partial non-performance."). The relevant UNIDROIT Principles section states that:
Non-performance by a party is excused if that party proves that the non-
performance was due to an impediment beyond its control and that it could
not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at
the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it
or its consequences.
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 168, art. 7.1.7(1). An altered currency would
never constitute total impossibility in commercial contracts because a substitute cur-
rency would still be available and the actual goods can still be delivered. See Southern,
supra note 140, at 27 (stating that, in a contract for the supply of goods for payment at
a fixed price, a replacement of the currency does not change the substance of the
contract).
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III. KEEPING THE DEAL TOGETHER: RATIONALES
FOR CONTINUITY
Although the consequences of a currency unification in the Euro-
pean Union may cause unexpected increases or decreases in the cost
of performance, the parties should continue to honor their contracts.
Such continuity promotes security in international trade and fosters
future trade relations. The aforementioned doctrines of commercial
impracticability or excuse should not succeed in this circumstance.
This part discusses the impact that contract continuity has on inter-
national trade. Part III uses three hypothetical value or cost change
ranges2 58 to evaluate scenarios with the tests set forth in the previous
section: severity, foreseeability, and allocation of risk.2 59 The first
range represents a loss in the value of performance or an increase in
the cost of performance of up to fifty percent. In this range, the issue
of insufficient severity is addressed. The second range presents a loss
in value or an increase in cost of between fifty and eighty percent. In
this range, issues of foreseeability and allocation of the risk are most
likely to arise. Lastly, the third range embodies a loss in value or in-
crease in cost of above eighty percent. In this case, a United States
court would be more willing to grant a discharge than for losses falling
into the other two ranges. This Note argues, however, that, rather
than discharging the obligations in this range, a court should first at-
tempt to compel renegotiation or reform the contract where this is
appropriate.
A. The Economic Need for Stability and Certainty of Contract
The United States and other nations benefit from healthy interna-
tional trade.260 International trade and, thus, commercial contracts,
have become increasingly important to the health of the U.S. econ-
omy.261 Furthermore, our economy needs certainty in those interna-
258. I have chosen these three ranges to organize my discussion. These ranges are
not intended to be strictly applied. Because impracticability is an equitable doctrine,
the threshold severity is subject to judicial discretion and, thus, a bright line rule is
inappropriate.
259. See supra notes 202-56 and accompanying text.
260. See Greenspan Testimony, supra note 19, at *41 (testifying that "the evidence
... very clearly demonstrates that the more crossborder trade that one can engage in,
the greater the degree of specialization, the higher the standards of living").
261. Seita, supra note 142, at 429-30, 443.
Globalization ... is foremost an economic process. Economic globalization
refers to the world-wide integration of markets. In economic globalization,
markets for goods, services, financial capital, and intellectual property take
on transnational or global proportions. A paramount consequence of mar-
ket integration has been increased economic interdependence among na-
tions .... For virtually all countries, transnational trade is important, if not
vital, to their economic prosperity.
Id. at 429-30, 443.
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tional contracts to encourage and facilitate international trade. 62
This need for certainty was recognized by all parties to the CISG. 263
The CISG incorporates policies promoting international trade by en-
couraging the preservation of deals and fostering cooperation in cases
of difficulties. ' 4
When courts excuse parties from contracts merely because of a re-
placement of currency, they create a sense of uncertainty and distrust
in the business world.265 In response, parties would shift from long-
term to short-term contracts to have more control over pricing."
This would exacerbate the cycle of economic booms and recessions
(also known as the business cycle) and decrease the standard of
living.267
Alternatively, when courts ensure the continuity of transatlantic
commercial contracts, they contribute to the stability of the interna-
262. See President Ronald Reagan's Letter of Transmittal, U.S. S. Treaty Doc. No.
98-9, 98th Cong. (1983), reprinted in The Convention for the International Sale of
Goods: A Handbook of Basic Materials 75 (Daniel Barstow Magraw & Reed R.
Kathrein eds., 2d ed. 1990). The letter states in part:
International trade now is subject to serious legal uncertainties. Questions
often arise as to whether our law or foreign law governs the transaction ....
The Convention's uniform rules offer effective answers to these problems.
Enhancing legal certainty for international sales contracts vill serve the in-
terests of all parties engaged in commerce by facilitating international trade.
Id. The opening provisions of the CISG state:
CONSIDERING that the development of international trade on the basis of
equality and mutual benefit is an important element in promoting friendly
relations among States, BEING OF THE OPINION that the adoption of
uniform rules which govern contracts for the international sale of goods and
take into account the different social, economic and legal systems would con-
tribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade and promote
the development of international trade, [the parties have agreed to the
CISG].
CISG, supra note 167, Preamble.
263. CISG, supra note 167, Preamble.
264. See Robert A. Hillman, Applying the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods: The Elusive Goal of Uniformity, in Review of the
CISG, supra note 240, at 21, 30-32.
The Convention's goal of saving deals promotes important international val-
ues pertinent to the contracting process. It supports important non-eco-
nomic motives for performing, encourages planning, and reduces costs. By
encouraging performance, the Convention fosters the parties' trust and co-
operation, thereby encouraging future exchanges and helping to unite the
international trading community.
Id. at 31.
265. "Because allocating risks through long-term contracts is essential to accurate
planning and, thus, to the viability of a business in a free market economy, courts
rarely excuse sophisticated commercial parties from their contractual obligations." H.
Ward Classen, Judicial Intervention in Contractual Relationships under the Uniform
Commercial Code and Common Law, 42 S.C. L. Rev. 379,383 (1991). -If the sanctity
of long-term contracts is disturbed, the accompanying uncertainty could create insta-
bility in the economic markets." Id.
266. Id. at 405.
267. Id. at 383.
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tional contracting environment.268 Just as a stable domestic con-
tracting environment is economically beneficial and allows parties to
allocate risks, 269 a sound international contracting environment also
better accommodates risks.2 70 Hence, it is very important not to un-
necessarily jeopardize the continuity of contracts.
B. The First Range: Severity of the Loss
In the first range-where currency values interfere with the cost or
value of performance up to fifty percent-the hardship thresholds will
most likely not be met.27 ' The UNIDROIT Principles' comments es-
tablish a threshold of fifty percent of value lost or cost increased of
performance for the hardship provisions to become applicable.272
Although the U.C.C. does not set forth a specific percentage, the fol-
lowing discussion shows that the threshold is as severe as the CISG
requirement, if not more So.273
268. See Perillo, Force Majeure, supra note 254, at 17-18.
It is difficult to believe that judges in reviewing the "factual" question of
foreseeability can refrain from taking into account the larger consequences
of a finding of foreseeability. If, in one case, American entry into the second
[sic] World War had been declared to be unforeseeable, how many
thousands, or tens of thousands of contracts would have to be dissolved be-
cause of impossibility or frustration? How many shipping and sales con-
tracts would have been thwarted by the Suez closings? How broadly would
international trade be disrupted and how much uncertainty would be in-
jected into domestic and international trade? I suggest that it is no accident
... that the courts are more willing to find an excuse where the supervening
event has drastic consequences only for one contract or a small number of
contracts than where the supervening event affects an enormous number of
transactions.
Id. (footnote omitted).
269. See Classen, supra note 265, at 383.
270. Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 Har. Int'l L.J. 221, 221-29 (1978) (discussing the
development of international commercial law based on equity and commercial prac-
tices to guard against risks inherent in the transactions).
271. See Southern, supra note 257, at 27 (stating that in a contract for the supply of
goods for payment at a fixed price a replacement of the currency does not change the
substance of the contract). For an analogous situation, see Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975). In that case, the court did not
excuse performance where the United States government interfered with oil prices
during an oil crisis.
272. See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 168, art. 6.2.2 cmt. 2 (commenting that
"an alteration amounting to 50% or more of the cost or the value of the performance
is likely to involve a 'fundamental' alteration"). According to one commentator, the
UNIDROIT Principles may be used as a gap filler to a CISG contract and, thus, a
court could import the fifty percent threshold into a contract dispute governed by the
CISG. Garro, supra note 173, at 1151-52.
273. See Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 495 F. Supp. 815 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (denying
plaintiffs an adjustment of an interest rate after the prime rate rose).
Variations in the value of a promised performance, caused by the constantly
varying factors that effect [sic] the bargaining appetites of men, are the rule
rather than the exception. Bargainers know this and swallow their losses
and disappointments, meantime keeping their promises .... Relief from
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In cases of disadvantage to the buyer or seller, he or she would be
arguing for commercial impracticability. Neither the U.C.C. nor the
CISG define a threshold severity. 74 Thus, the courts may turn to the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts to interpret the U.C.C.VS5 The
threshold lies beyond merely sustaining a loss. 2 7 6 According to the
Restatement, "[tihe frustration must be so severe that it is not fairly to
be regarded as within the risks that [the disadvantaged party] assumed
under the contract. 2 77
The high threshold level of severity a party must establish is re-
flected in a heavy evidentiary burden.27 In Nora Springs Cooperative
Co. v. Brandau,2 79 the party claiming impracticability (plaintiff) as-
serted that it did not perform because transportation costs became too
expensive.8 0 The plaintiff elevator company claimed excuse for not
accepting corn which it had contracted to purchase.8 1 It asserted that
it could not buy the corn because it could not pick it up due to a
shortage of railroad cars which made the cost of transportation too
expensive.8 The court did not grant an excuse because the plaintiff
had failed to show that the increased costs would be so prohibitive as
to alter "the essential nature of the performance."' Similarly, in
Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Cooperative, Inc.,'- the buyer as-
serted excuse, based on increased manufacturing costs which caused
operating losses. 85 The court found a breach of contract because the
buyer failed to show that the increased cost of performance would
constitute a "grave injustice" if the contract was not excused."-8 In
duty... can safely be granted on the ground of frustration of purpose by the
rise or fall of values, only when the variation in vahte is very great ....
Id- at 819 (emphasis added) (quoting Corbin, 6 Contracts, § 1355 (1962)).
274. Peter Winship, Domesticating International Commercial Law: Revising U.C.C.
Article 2 in Light of the United Nations Sales Convention, 37 Loy. L Rev. 43, 80 (1991)
(explaining that CISG art. 79 and U.C.C. § 2-615 "cover much the same ground").
For the purpose of this Note, I assumed that a judge will probably apply common law
definitions of severity or impracticability regardless of whether the contract is gov-
erned by the U.C.C. or the CISG.
275. Draper, supra note 200, § 2.
276. See Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 149 n.34 (6th Cir.
1983) (citing Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir.
1966)) (holding that an increase in cost of fifteen percent is not sufficient grounds for
excuse); Draper, supra note 200, § 2(b) (warning that "claims of commercial impracti-
cability based on increased costs, expenses, and the like, entail a heavy burden of
proving facts sufficient to justify such a claim").
277. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265 cmt. a.
278. Draper, supra note 200, § 2(b).
279. 247 N.W. 744 (Iowa 1976).
280. Id. at 746-47.
281. Id. at 747.
282. Id at 746.
283. Id. at 748.
284. 461 N.E.2d 1049 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
285. Id. at 1053. The increased manufacturing costs were caused by a rise in the
market demand for natural gas. Id.
286. Id. at 1061.
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United States v. Wegematic Corp.,28 7 the court came to a similar result
where engineering difficulties required an additional development ex-
pense of one million dollars or more, even when the contract itself was
worth only $231,800.211 The court held that the alleged additional ex-
penses were not "clearly prohibitive. ' 289 Therefore, the threshold of
severity lies beyond a mere increase in costs. Parties alleging imprac-
ticability based on increased costs must prove that the increased cost
altered the essential nature of the contract, were clearly prohibitive,
or that the obligation of performance, given the changed circum-
stance, would be gravely unjust.290
C. The Second Range: Allocation of Risk and Foreseeability
In the second range, the assumed change in the value or cost of
performance is between fifty and eighty percent. In this range, the
threshold level of severity is likely to be met under the U.C.C., the
CISG, and the UNIDROIT Principles. This does not end the inquiry,
however, as a finding of either foreseeability or of an allocation of the
risk will keep the court from excusing a party's duty to perform under
any of the potentially applicable bodies of law.291 As seen below,
neither requirement will usually be met in the context of the change-
over to the Euro.
1. Allocation of Risk
A party that has assumed the risk of a certain contingency is not
entitled to assert that event as an excuse.192 The risk associated with
the implementation of the Euro is analogous to any other govern-
ment-imposed change in a currency's value. In other cases, where the
person who is entitled to payment under the contract loses the value
of the bargain due to a currency devaluation, courts have held that the
risk of devaluation was allocated to him or her under the terms of the
contract and, thus, it did not excuse the obligation.2 93 By agreeing to
287. 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
288. Id. at 675.
289. Id. at 676-77.
290. See Draper, supra note 200, §§ 7, 10.
291. Draper, supra note 200, §§ 2(a), 3 (discussing requirements of the U.C.C. for
excuse); Honnold, supra note 233, at 426-27 (outlining the elements required by the
CISG to qualify for exemption from liability for non-performance); UNIDROIT Prin-
ciples, supra note 168, art. 6.2.2 (setting forth the elements of hardship).
292. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261. In that case, either the language of
the contract or the context would indicate that the party may not argue impracticabil-
ity. Susan E. Wuorinen, Case Comment, Northern Indiana Public Service Company v.
Carbon County Coal Company: Risk Assumption in Claims of Impossibility, Imprac-
ticality, and Frustration of Purpose, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 163, 165 (1989).
293. See, e.g., Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F.2d 1023, 1025 (2d Cir. 1931)
(affirming that "an obligation payable 'in terms of the currency of a country takes the
risk of currency fluctuations and whether the creditor or the debtor profits by the
change the law takes no account of it') (quoting Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, 272
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denominate the mode of payment in a certain currency, the obligee is
aware of any risks associated with traditional governmental control of
that currency.2 94 In the cases of Cuban2 95 and Chinese 96 currency re-
placement and concomitant devaluation, the obligee carried the risk
of the currency changes.297 Thus, the obligee, in this case the seller,
assumed the risk of a change in the value of the medium specified for
payment. It follows that in the case of a weak Euro, because a seller
carries the risk of disadvantageous exchange rates, he or she should
not be excused from a contract.
Where the buyer wants an excuse due to an increased price, most
courts have held that U.C.C. Section 2-615 applies.29g Most claims by
buyers asserting the U.C.C. Section 2-615 impracticability defense,
however, have been rebuffed by the courts.2 9 Excuse is not granted
when the buyer carried the risk of a disadvantageous exchange rate by
agreeing to the currency.3 0 An American buyer who agreed to pay in
U.S. 517, at 519 (1926)). In an analogous situation, concerning government controls
of oil prices, the seller was not excused from a disadvantageous oil supply contract.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
294. See hlnhan, 51 F.2d at 1025.
295. See Johansen v. Confederation Life Ass'n, 447 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding
that a Cuban life insurance policy to be paid in Cuban pesos, made at a time when it
was freely convertible on a one to one basis with the U.S. Dollar, was not to be paid,
to the plaintiff, in U.S. Dollars once the Cuban Peso lost such convertibility); Gonza-
lez y Camejo v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 313 F. Supp. 1011 (D.P.R. 1970)
(same).
296. See Shanghai Power Co. v. Del. Trust Co., 316 A.2d 589 (Del. Ch. 1974) (de-
claring lack of value of stock denominated in severely depreciated Chinese currency);
Sternberg v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 16 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961)
(declaring a life insurance policy denominated in severely devaluated Chinese Cur-
rency as valueless).
297. The Cuban and Chinese cases cited merely ruled on risk allocation, not con-
tinuity of contract.
298. See, e.g., Nora Springs Coop. Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744,748 (Iowa 1976)
("While the section expressly mentions sellers, the explanations in Comment 9 make
it evident the provisions should also be equally applicable to buyers." (emphasis in
original)). The same result was reached in Lawrance r. Ehnore Bean Warehouse, Inc..
702 P.2d 930, 932 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985), Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Energy Coop.,
Inc., 461 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (Il1. App. Ct. 1984). and Meuse-Rhine-ljssel Cattle Breed-
ers of Canada, Ltd v. Y-Tex Corp., 590 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 1979).
299. See Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265
(7th Cir. 1986) (not excusing utility from long-term, fixed-price coal contract because
the utility had assumed the risk); Hancock Paper Co. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 424 F.
Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (noting that both parties bargained for the risk of changes
in cost and, thus, a change in cost did not alter any duties under a fixed price con-
tract); Northern IlL Gas Co., 461 N.E.2d at 1059 (holding no frustration where event
was foreseeable); Nora Springs Coop., 247 N.W.2d at 748 (holding that economic bur-
den or unattractiveness of performance does not excuse non-performance); U.C.C.
§ 2-615 cmt. 4 (1977) (stating that "[i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse perform-
ance"); Draper, supra note 200, § 7, at 601 (stating that '[t]he mere fact that perform-
ance becomes economically burdensome or unattractive does not excuse
nonperformance [under] U.C.C. 2-615").
300. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
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a European currency has assumed a certain degree of exchange rate
risk in the nature of the payment obligation.3 °'
2. Foreseeability
Where the contracting parties could have foreseen the events which
impacted the cost or the value of the contract, courts will not apply
the excuse provided by U.C.C. Section 2-615 to the affected con-
tract.30 2 The same applies for contracts governed by the CISG or the
UNIDROIT Principles. 0 3 In the 1970s, for example, the oil crisis dis-
torted the value or costs of many contracts and basically crippled the
domestic economy." Many suppliers who had entered into fixed
price contracts litigated to be excused from their contractual obliga-
tions.30 5 For the most part, they did not succeed. The courts viewed
the oil crisis as a foreseeable event and, thus, would not excuse the
parties from their contractual obligations.0 6
To a certain extent, the applicability of excuse will depend on the
time at which the parties entered into their contract. For instance, if
the contract was drafted during the "Europessimism" era30 7 of the
1980s, the single currency might have been unforeseeable. 0 8 One
could argue, however, that a monetary union with a single European
301. Detjen Telephone Interview, supra note 138.
302. Draper, supra note 200, § § 2, 7.
303. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
304. For a discussion of the events leading up to the "energy crisis" that resulted
from the Arab oil embargo and 1973 OPEC sponsored oil price increases, see Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 433-34 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
305. Iowa Elec. Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding the energy crisis
foreseeable and, thus, refusing to consider whether performance had become imprac-
ticable); Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. at 437-42 (overruling a claim of impracticabil-
ity because of the foreseeability of the events causing the contract to become
burdensome, i.e. the energy crisis); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583
S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (denying that the Arab oil embargo constituted an
excuse because it was foreseeable).
306. "[The] possibility [of Arab oil embargo] was common knowledge and had
been thoroughly discussed and recognized for many years by our government, media
economists and business, and the fact that the embargo was imposed during the term
of the contract here involved was foreseeable." Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d at 728.
For a contemporary discussion of the courts' treatment of the oil crisis cases, see
Thomas Black, Sales Contracts and Impracticability in a Changing World, 13 St.
Mary's L.J. 247, 263-67 (1981).
307. "Europessimism" was a general popular sentiment in Europe where people
held little hope for the success of any European Community endeavors. Bermann,
supra note 33, at 13-14, 432.
308. See Contracts at Risk from Euro Conversion, Thomson's Int'l Banking Regula-
tor, Nov. 17, 1997, at 1 ("Contracts older than 1992, the year the formation of the
EMU was announced, and those contracts not governed by the laws of a state with
special statutes to protect these contracts, are particularly at risk of litigation ....
'Any contract made in the last few years, when the European Monetary Union was a
foreseeable option, is probably safe' . . . ." (quoting Seth Grosshandler, Attorney at
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton in New York)).
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currency was foreseeable beginning in 1992, when the Maastricht
Treaty included the chapter on the monetary union.30 Indeed, by
1997, many professional articles exhorted business to review existing
contracts and include Euro-terms in their new contracts. 310 At the
very least, by 1997 the introduction of the Euro was foreseeable. Con-
sequently, parties who entered into a contract in the mid-1990s and
thereafter will most likely not be excused from their contractual obli-
gations because the potential currency change to the Euro was fore-
seeable at the time of contracting.
One court's reasoning is persuasive in the instant case.3 ' The Mis-
souri Court of Appeals found that the business community and the
media recognized the oil crisis as a possible event long before it actu-
ally occurred. 12 Likewise, the EMU and the single currency have
long been a possibility. 13 Thus, just as the possibility of an oil crisis
was foreseen by the media and the business sector, so too is Europe's
achievement of the EMU and the introduction of a single European
currency. Furthermore, in the Missouri case, the mere fact that the
parties were not aware of the exact timing of the oil crisis did not
render the crisis unforeseeable.314 Similarly, the mere showing that
the parties doubted that the EMU would be implemented on time
should not hinder a court from finding that the events tending to
cause impracticability were foreseeable.
The foreseeability standard under the UNIDROIT Principles is
similar to that of the U.C.C. and the CISG: An event is not foresee-
309. See id.; supra Part I.A. Although the achievement of EMU was foreseeable,
there was some uncertainty as to the time it would begin. Wolfgang Mflnchau, Life
Will Not be the Same Under EMU, Fn. Tunes, Nov. 21, 1997, at 1 ("Two years ago,
not many would have bet that [EMU] would begin on time. Six months ago expecta-
tions began to change, and today the 1999 start of [EMU] is as certain as any future
event can be.").
310. Journal of Commerce Staff, How to Avoid Legal Tangles, J. Com., June 23,
1997, at 5A (advising companies to "[r]eview existing contracts that will continue be-
yond Jan. 1, 1999 [and to] [r]eview rate fixing, price source, indexation, increased cost,
prepayment, force majeur and other contractual provisions that may be affected");
Richard F. Kingham & David L. Harfst, Winning Legal Strategies: Beating the Odds
When You're Betting the Company, Corp. L. Tunes, Nov. 1997, at 40 (col.1) ("Con-
tracts, loan agreements, bond issues and other documents denominated in existing
national currencies of European countries must be reviewed, and agreements being
negotiated now must be written to take account of the ... possibility of a new reserve
currency to rival the dollar in international financial transactions."); Yerak, supra note
5, at 1H ("'You've got to look at all your legal contracts and loan agreements, which
may have to be adjusted' to include conversions to the euro .... 'It's important that
every vendor and customer contract and every lease agreement will somehow have to
be reviewed and changed [to reflect the change to the euro]."' (quoting William
Aamoth, Assistant International Treasurer of TRW Inc., and Mark J.D. Jarrad, Inter-
national Vice-President for Finance and Administration for Parker Hannifin Corp.)).
311. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979).
312. Id
313. See supra text accompanying notes 308-10.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 308-10.
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able if it "was so outside the bounds of probability that reasonable
parties would not provide for it."' 315 The UNIDROIT Principles give
an illustration of foreseeability 316 which indicates that extraordinary
depreciation in a foreign currency value due to a political crisis is an
"unforeseen" event.317 Thus, if the fixed exchange rates of the old
currency supply a grossly inadequate value due to a weak Euro caused
by political problems within the European Union, this might consti-
tute an unforeseen event under the UNIDROIT Principles. 318 Fur-
thermore, even assuming that the disadvantaged party meets all the
requirements for hardship, it is unlikely that a court would discharge
the contractual obligations. Instead, the provisions first entitle the
parties to compelled renegotiation or receive reformation. 31 9
D. The Third Range: Judicial Reformation of the Contract
In the third range, the contract value or cost has changed eighty
percent or more and is so dramatic as to require judicial intervention.
Such intervention could come in the form of discharge of the contrac-
tual obligation, reformation of the contract, or compelled renegoti-
ation.32 ° This section will argue that courts interpreting transatlantic
commercial contracts should first consider renegotiation and reforma-
tion before deciding to discharge the contractual obligations.
Relational values32 ' embodied in contracting are most respected by
judicial reformation. 322 Judicial reformation results in loss sharing3 3
315. Perillo, Force Majeure, supra note 254, at 23.
316. See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 168, art. 6.2.2 illus. 3.
317. See Perillo, Force Majeure, supra note 254, at 23.
318. This illustration is not exclusive. It is possible that a dramatic economic crisis
may also constitute an unforeseen event.
319. See supra notes 249-53 and accompanying text.
320. See Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstruction of Contracts, 71 Ind.
L.J. 45, 45 (1995) (discussing judicial interference in contracts); Robert A. HiUman,
Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract
Law. 1987 Duke L.J. 1, 1-2 (describing the variety of ways in which a judge can re-
spond to a case where a party claims excuse from contractual obligations).
321. Ian R. Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modem Contrac-
tual Relations 64-70, 75-77 (1980) (describing relational norms and comparing devel-
oping relational contract law to the neoclassical discrete contract law). In a relational
contract, the most important objective is to establish and maintain an economic rela-
tionship rather than allocate risks and costs of a transaction. Id.
322. See Hillman, supra note 320, at 4-6 (describing how relational values are im-
portant to parties in a long-term supply contract and arguing for a duty to adjust a
contract to reflect changed circumstances).
[P]arties want to continue to deal with each other because they are aware of
the costs of finding a market substitute after investing in a relationship and
after forming understandings that lower the cost of doing business .... [In
short,] both parties can increase mutual gains from the contract by remain-
ing flexible after signing the contract, thereby saving costs related to plan-
ning for risks and bickering after contract breakdown.
Id. at 5-6 (notes omitted).
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by avoiding an all or nothing approach.324 That approach perceives
risk allocation as the main function of contracting3l and ignores the
relational value of long-term contract practices. 32" Long-term supply
contracts, in particular, have a substantial relational dimension which
judges should take into account when fashioning relief.3 27 Admit-
tedly, not all situations are suited for judicial adjustment. 32 Adjust-
ment can be appropriate when "risk allocation is unclear, and, if the
hardship is severe enough, even when the intention to allocate the risk
is manifest."3 9 A survey of U.S. companies revealed that a plurality
of the surveyed companies preferred judicial reformation of their con-
tracts to complete excuse.330 The survey may indicate the business
community's recognition of the relational and fairness advantages in-
herent in loss sharing.331
Judicial reformation is authorized in the subchapter on hardship in
the UNIDROIT Principles. 332  Although United States courts have
not favored this option,333 Professor Joseph Perillo argues that Ameri-
can law should treat international commercial contracts differently
than domestic commercial contracts to fully respect the intentions of
323. Loss sharing can be an efficient and fair remedy. See Daniel T. Ostas & Frank
P. Darr, Understanding Commercial Inpracticability: Tempering Efficiency with Com-
munity Fairness Norms, 27 Rutgers LJ. 343, 364-66 (1996).
324. See Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine of Commercial Impracti-
cability: Searching for "The Wisdom of Solomon," 135 U. Pa. L Rev. 1123, 1125
(1987). The all or nothing approach means that "[o]ther things being equal, the seller
bears all of the risk unless performance is extremely burdensome, in which case the
buyer bears all the risk." Joskow, supra note 1, at 160.
325. See Classen, supra note 265, at 399 ("Improper allocation of the element of
risk is a serious concern because risk allocation is the primary reason for entering a
contract.").
326. Halpern, supra note 324, at 1171-73.
327. McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984).
Situations arising from [long-term] contracts like [that at issue] recommend
solutions by interparty renegotiation. When that does not work, courts
should make themselves available to provide just and equitable resolutions
with the primary goal being to maintain the integrity of the long-term con-
tractual relationship. This can be better achieved by remedies such as equi-
table adjustment than rescission or discharge from performance.
Id. at 779 (Harshbarger, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also Ostas & Darr,
supra note 323, at 354-55 ("[T]here may be years of personal or industry customs that
set particular norms or expectations of behavior. It should, therefore, be expected
that relational issues affect the resolution of excuse cases.").
328. See Halpern, supra note 324, at 1175.
329. Id. at 1168.
330. See Weintraub, supra note 141, at 42 ("[A] plurality [of the companies sur-
veyed favor] price adjustment, contrast[ing] with contract doctrine more than any
other survey result.").
331. Id.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 184-253.
333. Only one court has actually reformed a contract in such circumstances. Alumi-
num Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Hillman, supra
note 320, at 2 n.5.
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the contracting parties.334 He asserts that many international long-
term contracts contain a renegotiation clause to maintain flexibility.3 35
He proposes two situations in which courts should consider the lack of
a renegotiation term as a gap which they can fill with the help of the
UNIDROIT Principles.336
In one proposed situation, an unsophisticated party fails to include
such a commonly-used clause as a mere oversight. 337 In the second
proposed situation, a sophisticated party could have deliberately omit-
ted such a renegotiation clause.338 If a court finds that a contract gov-
erned by the CISG does have such a gap, then the UNIDROIT
Principles can be used as a gap-filler to justify and grant authority for
judicial reformation of the contract.339 If the court chooses to reform
the contract, the court would most likely re-allocate the loss by adjust-
ing the price of the goods and perhaps also the currency of payment to
reestablish the contract's equilibrium. 4 ° This solution recognizes the
need for parties to keep their promises and equitably saves the disad-
vantaged party from financial disaster.3 41
In conclusion, excusing a party from his or her contractual obliga-
tions because of the introduction of the Euro is inappropriate in the
majority of cases. Foremost, parties are unlikely to meet the threshold
334. See Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
supra note 184, at 301-02.
335. Id.
336. Id.; see also Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice -
The Experience of the First 71vo Years (visited Feb. 16, 1998) <http:I
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisgfbiblio/pr-exper.html>.
Three awards-two rendered by the International Court of Arbitration of
the Federal Chamber of Commerce of Vienna, [Award No. 4318 and Award
No. 4366 of 15 June 1994] and one by the Court of Arbitration of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce [ICC Award No. 8128 of 1995-refer to the
UNIDROIT Principles in order to fill a gap in the United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) .... There is
also a State court decision-more precisely, one rendered by the Court of
Appeal of Grenoble on 23 October 1996-using the UNIDROIT Principles
as a means to supplementing CISG.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
For a discussion of the role of the UNIDROIT Principles as a gap filler for the
CISG, see Garro, supra note 173, at 1151-52 (arguing that judges and arbitrators
would better achieve the goals of drafters of international instruments if they would
use the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles to avoid national solutions for interna-
tional problems).
337. See Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
supra note 184, at 301-02.
338. See id.
339. See supra note 336.
340. Judge Teitelbaum's famous loss-sharing decision, Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Es-
sex Group, Inc., presents a good example of judicial reformation. 499 F. Supp. 53, 78-
80 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
341. See Hillman, supra note 320, at 17-19 (discussing fairness norms); Ostas &
Darr, supra note 323, at 354-57 (describing when judicial readjustment is
appropriate).
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of severity to qualify for excuse. Secondly, risk of currency value de-
preciation is usually allocated to the obligee (seller) when he or she
accepts to be paid in a certain currency. The risk of currency value
appreciation is carried by a buyer who agrees to pay in such a cur-
rency. Therefore, circumstances are rare where the disadvantaged
party can show that the currency risk was not allocated. Furthermore,
the foreseeability inquiry will contribute to the unavailability of ex-
cuse from contractual obligations because excuse can only be granted
if the contract had been made before the EMU and the single cur-
rency became reasonably foreseeable. Finally, even if judicial inter-
vention becomes appropriate, judges can avoid granting a complete
discharge of the contractual obligations by compelling renegotiation
or reforming the contract.
CONCLUSION
There are compelling legal rationales and policy reasons to support
the continuity of contracts in the face of the replacement of European
national currencies with the Euro. The interests of the global econ-
omy are best served by not unnecessarily creating uncertainty for
long-term commercial contracts. An examination of the requirements
for excuse from contractual obligation reveals that, in the context of
the Euro introduction, excuse is largely inappropriate. Furthermore,
in the rare case where the contract is truly commercially impractica-
ble, a court can still foster continuity of contractual relations by com-
pelling renegotiation or reforming the contract.
Notes & Observations
